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The Promises and Pitfalls of State Eyewitness
Identification Reforms
Nicholas A. Kahn-Fogel
This article provides a comprehensive analysis of state-based
eyewitness identification reforms, including legislative directives,
evidentiary rules, and judicial interpretations of state constitutions as
providing greater protection against the use of unreliable eyewitness
evidence than the United State Supreme Court offered in its 1977
decision in Manson v. Brathwaite. While previous scholarship has
included thorough consideration of a single state's eyewitness law,
state-by-state analysis of a sub-issue in eyewitness law, and brief
general surveys of state approaches to eyewitness reform, this article
adds to the current body of scholarship with an in-depth evaluation of
eyewitness identification law in states that have either rejected the
federal constitutional test or have adopted other statewide measures to
reduce the likelihood of wrongful conviction through eyewitness
misidentification.
The analysis is based not only on examination of the texts of
legislative directives and of the seminal state judicial opinions that
scholars have cited previously as examples of state alternatives to
Manson, but also on assessment of the subsequent application and
qualification of those opinions, often in ways that have undermined
the modest progress of the earlier decisions. This evaluation
demonstrates that incremental, state-based reforms have been
significantly less promising than the qualfied praise they have
received would suggest. For states that have expressed a commitment
to assessing eyewitness evidence in accord with scientific developments,
this article's exposure of the conceptual inadequacy of many states'
measures, the inconsistent application of theoretically sound reorms,
and, frequently, retreat from broad statements of dedication to the
development of legal directives in harmony with scientific consensus,
should serve as a caution and as an inspiration to do better.
Ultimately, states should implement measures to ensure that law
enforcement will conduct identification procedures in accord with best
practices, and they should equi judges with the tools to prevent the use
of unreliable eyewitness evidence in court.
' Assistant Professor, University of Arkansas at Little Rock, William H. Bowen School of Law.
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INTRODUCTION
In this article, I will analyze state constitutional alternatives to the federal due
process standard for deciding the admissibility of eyewitness evidence and other
state-based mechanisms for guarding against unreliable eyewitness identifications.
It is widely accepted that eyewitness misidentification is a leading cause of wrongful
conviction.2 Nonetheless, it is unlikely that the United States Supreme Court will
revisit anytime soon the framework it developed in the 19 70s for evaluating
eyewitness evidence in Manson v. Brat/hwaite,3 despite decades of research
demonstrating flaws in the federal test--and in the ways lower courts regularly
apply it-that make it a poor mechanism for assessing the reliability of such
evidence.4 A 2012 Supreme Court decision, while not directly addressing the
continued validity of the Court's old due process standard, adopted a narrow
approach to determining whether due process arguments would be available at all
as a potential instrument for excluding tainted eyewitness identifications.5 In that
opinion, the Court suggested that other safeguards, including constitutional rights
to counsel and confrontation, state rules of evidence, and jury instructions, are the
primary means of protecting defendants against imperfect identification evidence.6
At the same time, a slowly growing number of state courts have rejected the federal
approach in favor of ostensibly more protective state constitutional tests for
analyzing eyewitness evidence, some state courts have implemented non-
constitutional evidentiary safeguards, and some state legislatures have statutorily
required law enforcement agencies to conduct identification procedures in ways
that reduce the potential for error. Because of the low probability of the United
States Supreme Court reforming the federal constitutional standard, state
alternatives to that approach are the best hope for those facing the possibility of
wrongful conviction based on eyewitness misidentification.
An analysis of the variety of state mechanisms for dealing with eyewitness
identification evidence is also particularly salient at the moment in light of highly
lauded recent decisions of the high courts of New Jersey and Oregon, which
endorsed the use by judges and juries of the past several decades of scientific
2 See, e.g., Jacqueline McMurtrie, The Role of the Social Sciences in Preventing Wrongful Convictions,
42 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1271, 1275 (2005); Sandra Guerra Thompson, Beyond a Reasonable Doubt?
Reconsidering Uncorroborated Eyewitness Identification Testimony, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1487, 1490-91
(2008); George Vallas, A Survey of Federal and State Standards for the Admission ofExpert Testimony on the
Reliability ofEyewitnesses, 39 AM.J. CRIM. L. 97, 100 (2011).
3 Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98,113-14 (1977).
4 See, e.g., Nicholas A. Kahn-Fogel, Manson and Its Progeny: An Empirical Analysis of American
Eyewitness Law, 3 ALA. C.R. & C.L. L. REV. 175 (2012) (summarizing social science research
suggesting flaws in the federal test and cataloguing decades of federal judicial decisions applying the test
in ways likely to lead to admission of unreliable eyewitness evidence) [hereinafter Kahn-Fogel, Manson
and Its Progeny].
' See Perry v. New Hampshire, 132 S. Ct. 716, 730 (2012).
6 Id. at 728-29.
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findings in assessing eyewitness evidence. 7 Drawing on New Jersey's example, the
Supreme Court of Idaho has also directed judges to incorporate these findings into
their adjudication of due process challenges to eyewitness evidence.' To the extent
that other states' approaches fall short of these directives, this analysis may provide
an incentive for judges and legislators in those states to make further reforms.
Additionally, if states that have expressed a desire to improve on the federal
standard have nonetheless fallen short in the formulation or implementation of
their alternative norms, examination of the ways in which they have done so may
sound a note of caution for decision-makers in jurisdictions like Oregon and New
Jersey, spurring those interested in preventing wrongful conviction to ensure
vigilant application of those states' sweeping new directives and to consider further
refinements in the future.
Other articles have briefly surveyed the range of state approaches to eyewitness
identification reform. 9 Some scholarship has included thorough analysis of a single
state's rules and standards for eyewitness identification evidence,' ° and some has
included state-by-state analysis of a single sub-issue within eyewitness law.1' This
article adds to the current body of research with an in-depth, comparative analysis
of eyewitness identification law in states that have either rejected the federal
constitutional test in interpreting their own constitutional requirements or have
adopted other statewide measures to reduce the likelihood of wrongful conviction
through eyewitness misidentification. My analysis is based not only on examination
of the texts of legislative directives and of the seminal state judicial opinions that
scholars have cited frequently as examples of state alternatives to Manson, but also
on assessment of the subsequent application and qualification of those opinions,
often in ways that have undermined the modest progress of the earlier decisions.
This analysis reinforces the conclusion others have drawn that the piecemeal
reforms adopted by several jurisdictions have been insufficient. It also demonstrates
that several state-based incremental reforms have been significantly less promising
than the qualified praise they have received would suggest. Finally, it provides a
See State v. Henderson, 27 A.3d 872 (N.J. 2011); State v. Lawson, 291 P.3d 673 (Or. 2012).
See State v. Almaraz, 301 P.3d 242, 251-53 (Idaho 2013).
9 In one of the more thorough analyses to date, Professor Sandra Guerra Thompson provides a six-
page overview of state alternatives to the federal due process test and a two-and-a-half-page description
of state approaches to expert testimony and jury instructions on eyewitness identification. Sandra Guerra
Thompson, Eyewitness Identifications and State Courts as Guardians Against Wrongful Conviction, 7 OHIO
ST.J. CRiM. L. 603, 623-31 (2010).
1o See, e.g., Katherine R. Kruse, Instituting Innocence Reorm: Wisconsin's New Governance
Experiment, 2006 WiS. L. REV. 645 (2006); Amy D. Trenary, State v. Henderson. A Model for
Admitting Eyewitness Identification Testimony, 84 U. COLO. L. REV. 1257 (2013); Steven J. Joffee,
Comment, Long Overdue: Utah's Incomplete Approach to Eyewitness Identification and Suggestions for
Reform, 2010 UTAH L. REV. 443 (2010); Anne E. Whitehead, Note, State v. Ramirez: Strengthening
Utah's StandardforAdmitting Eyewitness Identification Evidence, 1992 UTAH L. REV. 647 (1992).
11 See, e.g., Vallas, supra note 2.
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reassessment of the recent reforms the supreme courts of New Jersey and Oregon
have adopted and of the resounding adulation that followed those decisions.
The various legal mechanisms for reducing the likelihood of wrongful
conviction based on eyewitness misidentification are potentially interrelated. Even
if a state supreme court has retained the unsound federal constitutional test for
admissibility of eyewitness evidence in interpreting its own constitution, the flaws
in that test might be mitigated if the judges who apply it are informed by detailed
statutory provisions that describe the best ways to administer eyewitness
identification procedures. And if such statutory provisions require law enforcement
personnel to conduct identification procedures in compliance with scientifically
supported best practices, then courts might be less likely to have to grapple with the
constitutional admissibility of deeply tainted eyewitness evidence in the first place.
On the other hand, in a state that has abandoned the federal due process test in
favor of a more scientifically sound framework, judicial exclusion of evidence from
faulty procedures might induce law enforcement personnel to adopt better practices
even in the absence of a statutory mandate. Finally, effective use of jury instructions
or regular admission of expert testimony about the kinds of factors that affect the
reliability of eyewitness evidence might modestly reduce wrongful convictions,
regardless of whether state courts continue to use the federal constitutional
standard for assessing eyewitness evidence and even if neither the judiciary nor the
legislature has required state law enforcement personnel to use the best methods for
administering identification procedures.
In fact, my examination of cases in states that have adopted statutory or judicial
reforms of eyewitness law reveals mixed results. On the negative side, among states
that have interpreted their constitutions as requiring more stringent tests than the
federal due process standard, those tests have often failed to provide the kind of
guidance necessary to alert judges to the range of factors that can increase the odds
of misidentification. Perhaps more disturbingly, even when courts in these
jurisdictions have recognized the advantages of procedures psychologists have
recommended to reduce misidentification, such courts have been reluctant to
characterize failure to follow the recommended procedures as improper. As a
consequence, even under these revised approaches, judges often approve of deeply
unreliable identification procedures and neglect to consider conditions outside of
police control that decades of scientific research has shown are likely to impact an
eyewitness's ability to make an accurate identification. Furthermore, several states
that have imposed statutory requirements concerning the methods law enforcement
officers use to conduct identification procedures have failed to include any sanction,
exclusionary or otherwise, for noncompliance. Therefore, those statutory
requirements have tended to have a limited impact on the way judges evaluate
eyewitness identification evidence. In fact, even in jurisdictions in which statutory
provisions expressly require judges to take noncompliance with best practices into
account in adjudicating suppression motions, failure to administer identification
procedures according to statutory requirements and scientific recommendations has
often had a relatively insignificant effect on judicial analysis. When eyewitness
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statutes have required instructions informing jurors that they may take
noncompliance into account in gauging the reliability of eyewitness evidence, those
instructions have tended to be too vague to apprise jurors adequately of the reasons
why noncompliance makes the evidence in question suspect. Furthermore, even the
best instructions, and even admission of detailed expert testimony, have limited
impact on jurors and are inadequate substitutes for suppression of tainted evidence.
This is not to suggest that state reforms have lacked any benefit or promise
whatsoever. Several jurisdictions have approved the use of detailed instructions to
assist jurors in gauging the value of eyewitness evidence when courts do not exclude
it, and a number of state supreme courts have also instructed lower courts that
expert testimony on the topic should generally be admissible. 2 Although these
safeguards are less than ideal, they have some value. Additionally, examination of
cases in at least one state that has statutorily directed police to use scientifically
sound identification procedures reveals that, despite the failure of the judiciary to
adopt effective safeguards against tainted evidence, in recent cases in which
defendants challenged identification evidence, law enforcement personnel often
had substantially complied with the statute's requirements. 13 Finally, the supreme
courts of New Jersey, Oregon, and Idaho have adopted rules that should result in
lower courts taking serious account of the broad range of factors that can affect the
trustworthiness of eyewitness identification evidence. 4 If these states maintain
their commitments to the principles their high courts recently championed, the
cause of justice will be advanced. Ultimately, however, the record in other states
that have made efforts at reform, coupled with analysis of the directives the high
courts of New Jersey and Oregon issued, provides cause for only cautious optimism
about the future of eyewitness identification law even in those states.
In Part I of this article, I will trace the development of constitutional eyewitness
law by the United States Supreme Court. After holding for the first time in 1967
that eyewitness evidence must be suppressed in some cases as a matter of due
process,' 5 the Court articulated the current framework for assessing due process
claims in 1977 in Manson v. Brath'waite.16 Although the past four decades of
psychological science and extensive analysis of actual cases applying Manson have
thoroughly discredited that approach, the Court is unlikely to reform it in the near
future. The vast majority of states have purported to follow Manson in interpreting
their own constitutional requirements; those that have explicitly rejected Manson
have developed alternative approaches in reaction to the perceived shortcomings of
the federal directive.
12 See infra Part HII.
13 See infra notes 312-15.
14 See infra Part III.F.
15 See Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293,301-02 (1967).
16 Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 113-14 (1977).
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In Part II, I will summarize the psychological science that has exposed the array
of factors that can distort eyewitness memory and lead to misidentification. In Part
III, I will analyze the various ways in which state courts and legislatures have
deviated from the federal approach to eyewitness law. If these state innovations
represent the greatest potential for protecting most criminal defendants against the
possibility of misidentification, then a thorough review of the promises and pitfalls
of these disparate methods is warranted. If there is wisdom to be gained from one
or more of the legal directives under review, then states interested in enhancing the
integrity of their justice systems might draw on models first developed in other
jurisdictions, and, eventually, the United States Supreme Court might follow suit.
As my analysis will reveal, there is still room for improvement in all of the states
that have purported to provide enhanced legal protection against the risk of
wrongful conviction through eyewitness misidentification.
I. DEVELOPMENT OF CONSTITUTIONAL EYEWITNESS LAW
Until the latter half of the twentieth century, the general rule in the United
States was that any problems with the quality of eyewitness identification evidence
went to the weight, not the admissibility, of that evidence and that the jury bore
the ultimate responsibility for assessing the credibility and reliability of an
eyewitness's identification.17 In a trilogy of landmark cases released on the same day
in 1967, however, the Supreme Court ruled for the first time that the Constitution
requires suppression of some identification evidence. In United States v. Wade and
Gilbert v. California, the Court held that a post-indictment lineup is a critical stage
in a criminal prosecution, and, unless the defendant waives his Sixth Amendment
rights, defense counsel's absence from such a procedure requires suppression of
evidence from the lineup.'8 The court also ruled, however, that even when the
lineup evidence itself must be suppressed, a witness would be permitted to identify
the defendant in court if the prosecution could prove the witness had an
independent source for his identification.' 9 The Court stated that the factors judges
should evaluate in deciding the independent source question include:
the prior opportunity to observe the alleged criminal act, the existence of any
discrepancy between any pre-lineup description and the defendant's actual
description, any identification prior to lineup of another person, the identification
by picture of the defendant prior to the lineup, failure to identify the defendant
on a prior occasion, and the lapse of time betweer the alleged act and the lineup
identification.'
17 See Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 382 (1968).
58 United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 236-38 (1967); Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 272
(1967).
'9 Wade, 388 U.S. at 240-42; Gilbert, 388 U.S. at 272.
10 Wade, 388 U.S. at 241.
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In Stovall v. Denno, the Court held that, regardless of whether a defendant's
Sixth Amendment rights were implicated or violated, some identification
procedures are "so unnecessarily suggestive and conducive to irreparable mistaken
identification" that eyewitness evidence must be suppressed as a matter of due
process.
21
While the Stovall Court's language suggested that flawed identification
procedures themselves might violate due process, the Court shifted its approach
nine months later in Simmons v. United States, focusing in that case on the overall
reliability of the identification evidence rather than merely the flaws in the
identification procedure. 22 The Simmons Court emphasized the high quality of the
witnesses' opportunities to view the perpetrator and their high levels of certainty in
their identifications. 23 Ultimately, the Court concluded there was no due process
violation in admitting the evidence because there was little doubt that the witnesses
were actually correct in their identification of Simmons.24 Scholars have frequently
characterized Simmons as the beginning of the Court's unraveling of the robust
protection it had offered in Stovalk,25 while Stovall provided a per se rule of
exclusion for evidence derived from flawed procedures, Simmons rejected this
categorical approach in favor of a reliability analysis that would often allow
admission of eyewitness evidence even when an identification procedure was
unnecessarily suggestive.2 6 Consequently, some of the states that have rejected the
Supreme Court's current due process test have explicitly modeled their rules on
Stovall, based on the belief that it provides greater protection against the possibility
of wrongful conviction through misidentification. 27 As I have discussed in previous
21 Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293,301-02 (1967).
22 Simmons, 390 U.S. at 385-86.
2Id. at 385.
24 Id. at 385-86.
25 See, e.g., Timothy P. O'Toole & Giovanna Shay, Manson v. Brathwaite Revisited Towards a New
Rule of Decision for Due Process Challenges to Eyewitness Identification Procedures, 41 VAL. U. L. REv. 109,
123-24 (2006); Charles A. Pulaski, Neil v. Biggers: The Supreme Court Dismantles the Wade Trilogy's
Due Process Protection, 26 STAN. L. REV. 1097, 1108-09 (1974); Benjamin E. Rosenberg, Rethinking the
Right to Due Process in Connection with Pretrial Identification Procedures: An Analysis and a Proposal, 79
KY. L.J. 259, 266-68 (1990-91); Dori Lynn Yob, Comment, Mistaken Identifications Cause Wrongfud
Convictions. New Jersey's Lineup Guidelines Restore Hope, but Are They Enough., 43 SANTA CLARA L.
REv. 213, 229-30 (2002); Jessica Lee, Note, No Exigency, No Consent: Protecting Innocent Suspects fom
the Consequences of Non-Exigent Show-Ups, 36 COLuM. HUM. RTs. L. REV. 755, 786-87, 89 (2005);
David E. Paseltiner, Note, Twenty-Years of Diminishing Protection: A Proposal to Return to the Wade
Trilogy's Standards, 15 HOFSTRA L. REV. 583, 589-90 (1987). But see Ofer Raban, On Suggestive and
Necessary Identification Procedures, 37 AM. J. CRIM. L. 53, 58-59 (2009) (arguing that unreliable
identification evidence should be suppressed whether or not a challenged pre-trial procedure was
necessary and that Simmons thus improved on Stovall by focusing in part on whether the evidence was
reliable, rather than simply on unnecessary suggestion).
25 Simmons, 390 U.S. at 385-86.
27 See Commonwealth v. Johnson, 650 N.E.2d 1257, 1260-61 (Mass. 1995); State v. Dubose, 699
N.W.2d 582, 593-94 (Wis. 2005); see also People v. Adams, 423 N.E.2d 379, 383-84 (N.Y. 1981)
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articles in analysis of cases applying Stovall in the months before Simmons," and as
I will discuss in detail below in the context of states that have adopted variations of
the Stovall rule, 29 the notion that Stovall, without more, offers significantly
enhanced security against misidentification is not supported by the evidence.
The Supreme Court reaffirmed its shift toward a reliability analysis, as opposed
to a focus merely on problematic identification procedures, in 1972 in Neil v.
Biggers.30 The Biggers Court stated that, at least in a case in which the
confrontation and trial had taken place before Stovall, identification evidence
would be admissible, even if there had been an unnecessarily suggestive procedure,
so long as the evidence was reliable under the totality of the circumstances. 31 To
inform its reliability analysis, the Biggers Court articulated five factors it considered
relevant to the inquiry:
[(1)] the opportunity of the witness to view the criminal at the time of the crime,
[(2)] the witness' degree of attention, [(3)] the accuracy of the witness' prior
description of the criminal, [(4)] the level of certainty demonstrated by the
witness at the confrontation, and [(5)] the length of time between the crime and
the confrontation.32
The Biggers Court dearly proclaimed that the "likelihood of misidentification,"
rather than a suggestive procedure in and of itself, is what violates a defendant's due
process rights.33 However, the Biggers Court left open the possibility that per se
exclusion of evidence derived from unnecessarily suggestive confrontations might
be available to defendants whose confrontations and trials took place after Stovall.34
Thus, the Court revisited the issue once more in 1977 in Manson v. Bratbwaite.
The Manson Court made dear that the standard from Biggers would govern all
due process challenges to eyewitness evidence, stating that judges should weigh the
five factors against the "corrupting effect of the suggestive identification." 35
Ultimately, the Court affirmed that "reliability is the linchpin in determining the
admissibility of identification testimony."36 In rejecting the per se exclusionary rule,
the Court acknowledged that such a rule would promote greater deterrence against
(rejecting Manson's reliability test in favor of per se exclusion of unnecessarily suggestive pretrial
identification evidence, without explicitly invoking Stoval.
2 Kahn-Fogel, Manson and Its Progeny, supra note 4, at 192-93; Nicholas A. Kahn-Fogel, Beyond
Manson and Lukolongo: A Critique ofAmerican and Zambian Eyewitness Law with Recommendations for
Reform in the Developing World, 20 FLA. J. INT'L L. 279, 304-08 (2008) [hereinafter Kahn-Fogel,
Beyond Manson].
29 See infra Part IH.
s Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188 (1972).
31 See id. at 198-99.
32 Id. at 199.
33 See id. at 198.
34 See id. at 198-99.
31 Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98,114 (1977).
3 6 id.
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the use of suggestive procedures, 37 and it noted a "surprising unanimity among
scholars" that the per se approach was "essential to avoid serious risk of miscarriage
of justice."38 However, the Court concluded the cost to society of not being able to
use reliable evidence of guilt in criminal prosecutions would be too high.39 The
Manson Court also made dear that its new standard would apply to both pre-trial
and in-court identification evidence, thus resulting in a unified analysis of all
identification evidence in the wake of suggestive procedures.' In contrast, the
Stovall Court had not specified whether unnecessarily suggestive procedures would
require per se exclusion of both pre-trial identification evidence and any in-court
identification, or alternatively, whether witnesses who had viewed unnecessarily
suggestive procedures might nonetheless be allowed to identify defendants in court
after an independent source determination.
4 1
Even before Wade, Gilbert, and Stovall, the role of misidentification by
eyewitnesses in producing wrongful convictions was well established. In 1932,
Edwin Borchard's Convicting the Innocent listed eyewitness error as "perhaps a
major source" of wrongfil convictions, 42 and, before that, Hugo Misnsterberg's
research as the head of Harvard's psychology laboratory had demonstrated the
severe unreliability of eyewitness memory.43 In Wade itself, the Court had
acknowledged that "[t]he vagaries of eyewitness identification are well-known" and
noted that "the annals of criminal law are rife with instances of mistaken
identification."' Today, it is clear that misidentification by eyewitnesses remains a
leading cause of wrongful conviction; among the 330 DNA exonerations to date,45
more than seventy percent were initially convicted at least in part due to
misidentification by an eyewitness.4 Because DNA evidence is generally available
in only a limited class of cases, it is clear these exonerations represent only the tip of
the iceberg of wrongful convictions in the United States.
4 7
371 Id. at 112.
351-d. at 111 (quoting United States ex rel. Kirby v. Sturgess, 510 F.2d 397,405 (7th Cir. 1975).
" Cf id. at 111-13 (discussing the potentially negative effect of a rigid per se exclusionary rule on
the administration of justice).
o See id. at 106 n.9.
41 See Rosenberg, supra note 25, at 265-66.
42 EDWIN M. BORCHARD, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT: SIXTY-FIVE ACTUAL ERRORS OF
CRIMINAL JUSTICE 367 (1932).
43 HUGO MUNSTERBERG, ON THE WITNESS STAND: ESSAYS ON PSYCHOLOGY AND CRIME
15-70 (1908).
4 United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 228 (1967).
45 The Cases: DNA Exoneree Profiles, INNOCENCE PROJECT
http://www.innocenceproject.org/cases-false-imprisonment (last visited Oct. 11, 2015).
4 Eyewitness Misidentification, INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org/causes-
wrongful-conviction/eyewitness-misidentification (last visited Oct. 11, 2015).
" Rape cases tend to be the only category of case likely to yield testable DNA evidence that can
prove innocence definitively. Yet each year there are far more cases in which eyewitness evidence is likely
to be crucial that do not involve sexual assault. In 2012, for example, Federal Bureau of Investigation
statistics show there were more than four times as many reported robberies as forcible rapes in the
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
Since Manson, moreover, nearly four decades of psychological research has cast
doubt on the efficacy of that standard for sorting reliable from unreliable
evidence.48 Analysis of federal cases applying Manson has reinforced that research
and has demonstrated that courts using Manson rarely suppress eyewitness evidence
in the wake of flawed procedures, and they often undermine even the limited
probative value the standard might have if applied in conjunction with the
teachings of eyewitness science. 49 The Supreme Court, however, has not responded
to this science, and Manson remains the federal constitutional standard. The vast
majority of states have also followed Manson in interpreting the requirements of
their own constitutions.
Most recently, in 2012, the Supreme Court issued its opinion in Perry v. New
Hampshire, ruling that due process concerns are not implicated when suggestive
conduct arises outside the context of police-arranged identification procedures.5 0 In
so doing, the Court overruled precedent from the First,5 1 Second,52 and Sixth
Circuits.5 3 Although the narrow question presented in Perry did not give the Court
the opportunity to revise the Manson test, the Court gave no indication that it was
inclined to do so. On the contrary, the Court stressed that juries, rather than
judges, should generally determine the ultimate reliability of evidence, and it
argued that traditional safeguards built into the adversary system, like cross-
examination, supported by constitutional rights to counsel and confrontation,
prevent juries from giving undue weight to eyewitness evidence.5" Finally, the
Court noted that jury instructions, admission of expert testimony, and Federal Rule
of Evidence 403 (and its state counterparts), can provide further protection against
the dangers of unreliable eyewitness evidence. 55
At the federal level, some courts have approved instructions that warn jurors to
evaluate eyewitness evidence with caution and inform juries of some of the factors
that might impact reliability. 56 Some courts have also favored the admissibility of
expert testimony on the issue.5 7 However, as I will discuss below, these instructions
have tended to exclude detailed explanations of the wide array of variables likely to
United States. Crime in the United States 2012, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION,
https'//www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/crime-in-the-u.s/2012/crime-in-the-u.s.-
2012/tables/12tabledatadecpdf (last visited Oct. 11, 2015).
4 See infra Part I1.
4 See Kahn-Fogel, Manson andIts Progeny, supra note 4.
Perry v. New Hampshire, 132 S. Ct. 716, 720-21, 728 (2012).
51 United States v. Bouthot, 878 F.2d 1506, 1516 (1st Cir. 1989).
52 Dunnigan v. Keane, 137 F.3d 117,128 (2d Cir. 1998).
3 Thigpen v. Cory, 804 F.2d 893, 895 (6th Cir. 1986).
54 Perry, 132 S. Ct. at 728-29.
55 id.
56 See, e.g., United States v. Telfaire, 469 F2d 552, 558-59 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
57 See Vallas, supra note 2, at 119-24.
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affect eyewitness memory, and even expert testimony and the most detailed
instructions are likely to be of only limited value.
58
While Congress has not acted to require federal law enforcement agencies to
use best practices in the administration of identification procedures, the
Department of Justice has published guidelines urging law enforcement officers to
use several scientifically approved techniques for conducting identification
procedures.59 However, the guide explicitly states that it is not a legal mandate and
is not intended as a proposal of legal criteria for the admissibility of evidence.
60
II. THE SCIENCE OF EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION
At the time of Manson, eyewitness science was still in its incipient stages.
Although scientists had documented problems with eyewitness memory since the
early twentieth century, they had not yet developed research to reveal the range of
variables that can reduce reliability in individual cases. 61 In the four decades since
Manson, however, psychological experiments have conclusively established a wide
variety of factors that affect the reliability of eyewitness memory.62 That body of
research has shown that the Manson factors are woefully incomplete. It has also
undermined the validity of the factors the Manson Court did invoke to test
reliability. 63 Scientists have generally classified the variables that impact the
trustworthiness of eyewitness evidence as either estimator or system variables.
64
Estimator variables include all factors outside the control of law enforcement that
impact eyewitness accuracy, including viewing conditions at the time of the crime,
the nature of the crime itself, and psychological and physical characteristics of the
witnesses and of the perpetrator. 6 System variables, on the other hand, are
variables within the control of law enforcement, such as the administration and
composition of identification procedures. 66
5s See infra Part II.C.
59 See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, EYEWITNESS EVIDENCE: A GUIDE FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT 3,
9,27-38 (1999), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdifdesl/nij/178240.pdf.
60Id. at2.
61 See, e.g., JAMES M. DOYLE, TRUE WITNESS: COPS, COURTS, SCIENCE, AND THE BATrLE
AGAINST MISIDENTIFICATION 49-63, 83-99 (2005); see also Kahn-Fogel, Manson and Its Progeny,
supra note 4, at 183-84.
65 See Gary L. Wells & Deah S. Quinlivan, Suggestive Eyewitness Identification Procedures and the
Supreme Court's Reliability Test in Light of Eyewitness Science. 30 Years Later, 33 LAW & HuM. BEHAV.
1, 5 (2009) [hereinafter Wells & Qjinlivan].
63 See, e.g., id. at 9-18 (examining "the Manson reliability criteria in the context of the science that
has emerged since Manson"); see also Kahn-Fogel, Manson andIts Progeny, supra note 4, at 183-84.
6 Professor Gary Wells first used these terms during the early stages of the development of the new
wave of eyewitness science that began in the 1970s. See Gary L. Wells, Applied Eyewitness-Testimony
Research: System Variables and Estimator Variables, 36 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1546, 1548
(1978).
65 See id. at 1548-50.
1 See id. at 1548, 1552-54.
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A. System Variables
Several decades of research has proved that the manner in which law
enforcement officers construct and administer identification procedures has a
profound effect on the accuracy of eyewitness memory.67 This research has resulted
in a variety of widely accepted recommendations to minimize the potential for
misidentification. Among the most common research-based guidelines are blind
administration of identification procedures, warning witnesses that the actual
perpetrator might be absent from an identification procedure, ensuring suspects do
not stand out from non-suspect fillers when witnesses view lineups and photo
arrays, and recording witnesses' confidence immediately after they make
identifications.
One of the most basic ways those who design identification procedures can
reduce misidentification is to construct such procedures to ensure the suspect does
not stand out from other participants in ways that suggest his identity to witnesses.
Research has shown that witnesses are likely to engage in what scientists refer to as
the "relative judgment process," comparing participants in a lineup or photo array
to each other and choosing the person who most closely resembles their memories
of the appearance of the criminal, whether or not the actual perpetrator is present. 68
If the suspect is the only person in a lineup or photo array who resembles witnesses'
descriptions of the perpetrator, then witnesses are likely to choose that suspect,
even if he is innocent.69 Likewise, if the suspect stands out in any other significant
way, it is likely to draw witnesses' attention to him and may suggest that police
believe he is the perpetrator. 70 In some cases, this has involved using a mugshot
photo of the suspect while using more neutral photos of fillers,7' and in others it
has involved a suspect being the only person in an identification procedure wearing
prison clothing.72 Thus, administrators of identification procedures should make
67 See, e.g., DOYLE, supra note 61, at 49-63, 83-99.
68 See Steven M. Smith et al., Postdictors of Eyewitness Errors: Can False Identifications be Diagnosed
in the Cross-Race Situation?, 7 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 153, 155 (2001); Gary L. Wells et al.,
Eyewitness Identification Procedures: Recommendations for Lineups and Pbotospreads, 23 LAW & HUM.
BEHAv. 603, 613-14 (1998) [hereinafter Wells et al., Eyewitness Identification Procedures]; Gary L.
Wells & Eric P. Seelau, Eyewitness Identification:- Psychological Research and Legal Policy on Lineups, 1
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 765, 768-69 (1995).
61 See David A. Sonenshein & Robin Nilon, Eyewitness Errors and Wrongfl Convictions: Let's Give
Science a Chance, 89 OR. L. REV. 263, 272 (201.0); see also Wells et al., Eyewitness Identification
Procedures, supra note 68, at 632.
0 See Wells et al., Eyewitness Ident/ication Procedures, supra note 68, at 630.
71 See, e.g., Milteer v. Baker, No. 96-3421, 1997 WL 415308, *4-5 (6th Cir. Jul 18, 1997)
(affirming a grant of habeas relief in a case in which the habeas petitioner's photo was the only one in an
array with mugshot identification numbers, he was the only person depicted with a beard, police told
witnesses a suspect was in the array, and police showed at least one witness a separate, color photo of the
petitioner).
72 See, e.g., Haliyrn v. Mitchell, 492 F.3d 680, 703-07 (6th Cir. 2007) (finding identification reliable
despite unnecessarily suggestive lineup in which petitioner was the only person bandaged or wearing
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sure the suspect is not the only participant who resembles the description of the
perpetrator, and they should prevent the suspect from standing out in other
significant ways.
73
The most suggestive kind of identification procedure, a showup, involves police
presenting only a single suspect to witnesses, who are asked merely to confirm or
deny that that person is the perpetrator. 74 Unsurprisingly, given that a showup
procedure necessarily communicates to the witness the identity of the person police
suspect to be the perpetrator, research has demonstrated that the use of showup
identifications can increase the odds of misidentification.7" Nonetheless, although
the Stovall Court acknowledged that showups had been "widely condemned," it
approved the use of the procedure in that case, given the need for an immediate
identification by a witness with an uncertain prognosis after incurring eleven stab
wounds. 76 Since Stovall, courts around the country have regularly approved of the
use of showups.
77
prison clothing); Shelton v. Dir. of Dep't of Corr., No. 3:08cv270, 2009 WL 790013, at *6 (E.D.
Va. Mar. 23, 2009) (assuming, arguendo, that a photo array viewed by witness was unduly suggestive
because only petitioner and one other participant wore orange jumpsuits, but finding witness's
identification reliable).
' Wells et al., Eyewitness Identification Procedures, supra note 68, at 630; see also Sonenshein &
Nilon, supra note 69, at 272; Wells & Quirlivan, supra note 62, at 7.
7 See Wells et al., Eyewitness Identification Procedures, supra note 68, at 630.
s Some research has suggested that showups conducted within a few minutes of a crime are as
reliable as lineups. See A. Daniel Yarmey et al.,Accuracy of Eyewitness Identifications in Sbowups and
Lineups, 20 LAW &HuM. BEHAV. 459,464 (1996) [hereinafter Yarmey et al.]. This may be due to the
fact that the freshness of witness memory shortly after a crime balances out the corrupting effect of the
suggestive procedure. See State v. Henderson, 27 A.3d 872, 903 (NJ. 2011). Nonetheless, two hours
after an initial encounter, fifty-eight percent of witnesses failed to reject an innocent suspect, while only
fourteen percent of those who viewed a lineup at the same time made the same error. Yarmey et al.,
supra note 75, at 464; see also Nancy Steblay et al., Eyewitness Accuracy Rates in Police Showup and Lineup
Presentations: A Meta-Analytic Comparison, 27 LAW & HUM. BEHAv. 523, 523 (2003) (finding that
showup procedures result in higher rates of misidentification in cases in which an innocent suspect
resembles the perpetrator); Jennifer E. Dysart et al., Show-ups: The Critical Issue of Clothing Bias, 20
APPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 1009, 1019 (2006) (finding that showups increase the likelihood that
witnesses will base their identifications more on similar clothing between suspect and perpetrator than
on similar facial features).
76 Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 295, 302 (1967).
7 See, e.g.,Johnson v. Dugger, 817 F.2d 726, 729 (11th Cir. 1987); United States v. Rice, 652 F.2d
521, 528 (5th Cir. 1981) (citing Stovall in noting that showups have been "widely condemned," but
asserting that various exigencies, including the interest in rapid crime solution, can justify the use of
showups); Rodriguez v. Artus, No. 07-CV-00185S(FP), 2010 WL 1543857, at *17 (W.D.N.Y. Feb. 18,
2010) (quoting Stovall in noting that showups have been "widely condemned," but holding that exigent
circumstances, including the need to quickly confirm the identity of a suspect or to release an innocent
suspect, justify the use of showups); Self v. State, 537 S.E.2d 723, 726-27 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000)
(upholding trial court determination that showup conducted three and one-half hours after crime was
not unnecessarily suggestive); People v. Parham, No. 2-09-1219, 2011 WL 10102489, at "1, *6 (Ill.
App. Ct. Sept. 30, 2011) (finding showup conducted twenty to twenty-five minutes after crime not
unnecessarily suggestive); State v. Caine, 652 So. 2d 611, 613-14 (La. Ct. App. 1995) (finding showup
at police station seven hours after crime not unnecessarily suggestive); State v. Wilson, 827 A.2d 1143,
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Eyewitness scientists also agree that administrators of identification procedures
should be blind, meaning that such administrators should be unaware of the
identity of the suspect.78 Because of the potential influence an administrator might
have on the outcome, the gold standard for all scientific experimentation is to use
blind administration.79 This rule accounts for both deliberate interference with
experimental results and the potential for unintentional, subconscious influences.
Like any other experiment, an identification procedure involves a hypothesis: a law
enforcement agency believes the suspect might be the actual perpetrator of the
crime. The officers who conduct the procedure test that hypothesis by asking
witnesses to see whether they recognize the criminal. It is likely that the vast
majority of police officers who conduct identification procedures do so in good
faith. Nonetheless, when those officers know the identity of the suspect, there is a
risk they will inadvertently give witnesses subtle cues about their hypothesis.80 Even
signals as seemingly insignificant as a pause, a minute gesture, or the hint of a smile
can influence witnesses, yet witnesses and administrators are unlikely to be aware
that anything improper has occurred."1
Unsurprisingly, studies have shown that when the administrator of a lineup
believes she knows the identity of the culprit, it influences witnesses' choices. 82
Even so, in the vast majority of jurisdictions around the country, the officers who
administer identification procedures are familiar with the case and take no steps to
shield themselves from knowing which participant in a lineup or photo array the
witness is viewing at any given time. 3 With showups, of course, the very nature of
the procedure entails both the officer and the witness knowing the identity of the
1147-48 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2003) (finding that showup identification of defendant while
defendant was handcuffed in the back of a police car was not unduly suggestive); People v. Williams,
127 A.D.2d 718, 718 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987) (finding showup not unnecessarily suggestive); State v.
Addai, 778 N.W.2d 555, 566-67 (N.D. 2010) (finding showup identification conducted between
fifteen minutes and one hour after stabbing not unnecessarily suggestive).
71 See, e.g., Wells et al., Eyewitness Identification Procedures, supra note 68, at 627-29.
9 See id. at 627; see also ROBERT ROSENTHAL, Studies of Experimenter Expectancy Effects, in
EXPERIMENTER EFFECTS IN BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH 141-302, 367-79 (Irvington Publishers, Inc.
1976) (1966) (explaining the effect an experimenter's expectations can have on an experiment and
highlighting the desirability of blind administration).
' See Wells & Quinlivan, supra note 62, at 7-8.
s See id. at 8.
2 See, e.g., Ryann M. Haw & Ronald P. Fisher, Effects of Administrator-Witness Contact on
Eyewitness Identification Accuracy, 89 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 1106, 1106-11 (2004); see also Mark R.
Phillips et al., Double-Blind Photoarray Administration as a Safeguard Against Investigator Bias, 84 J.
APPLIED PSYCHOL. 940, 940 (1999).
3 See Keith A. Findley, Reforming Eyewitness Identification Procedures to Enhance Reliability and
Protect the Innocent, in ADAPTING TO NEW EYEWITNESS IDENTIFiCATION PROCEDURES: LEADING
EXPERTS ON CHALLENGING TRADITIONAL PROCESSES AND INTEGRATING NEW TECHNIQUES
107-08 (2010); Melissa B. Russano et al., "W",y Don't You Take Another Look at Number Three?"."
Investigator Knowledge and Its Effects on Eyewitness Confidence and Identfication Decisions, 4 CARDOZO
PUB. L. POLY & ETHICS J. 355, 366-67 (2006); Sonenshein & Nilon, supra note 69, at 271; Wells et
al., Eyewitness Identification Procedures, supra note 68, at 627.
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suspect. However, as previously mentioned, police in most jurisdictions still use the
technique regularly.
Similarly, there is widespread agreement among psychologists that police
should warn witnesses that the actual perpetrator might not be present and that
witnesses should feel no pressure to make an identification. 84 These warnings
reduce the likelihood that witnesses will use the relative judgment process to pick
an innocent suspect by counteracting the natural inclination of witnesses to assume
that, if police have asked them to view an identification procedure, the perpetrator
must be among those present.85 Police might overtly reinforce this inclination with
explicit statements that they have a suspect, but even mere silence from police
increases the odds that witnesses will choose an innocent suspect from a procedure
at which the perpetrator is absent.8 6 Research has demonstrated, however, that
warnings reduce the likelihood that witnesses will identify anyone from a culprit-
absent procedure without having an appreciable influence on the rate of correct
identifications when the perpetrator is actually present.87
Eyewitness scientists also agree unanimously that police should take immediate
statements of certainty from eyewitnesses when they make an identification.
88
Research has proven that eyewitness confidence is highly malleable. A suggestive
identification procedure, or post-identification feedback, artificially inflates
witnesses' certainty in the accuracy of their identifications.89 In fact, such feedback
inflates not only the witness's subsequent confidence, but also leads witnesses to
remember having been more confident at the time of the earlier identification. 9° By
recording certainty statements immediately, administrators can counter the
inflationary effects of confirmatory comments from law enforcement officers, of the
4 See, e.g., Roy S. Malpass & Patricia G. Devine, Eyewitness Identification: Lineup Instructions and
the Absence of the Offender, 66 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 482 (1981); Wells et al., Eyewitness Identfication
Procedures, supra note 68, at 629; see also Nancy Mehrkens Steblay, Social Influence in Eyewitness Recall: A
Meta-Analytic Review ofLineup Instruction Effects, 21 LAw &HUM. BEHAv. 283,287-93 (1997).
" Wells et al., Eyewitness Identfication Procedures, supra note 68, at 629; see also Malpass & Devine,
supra note 84, at 487; Steblay, supra note 84, at 287-93.
56 See Malpass & Devine, supra note 84, at 487-89; see also Wells et al., Eyewitness Identification
Procedures, supra note 68, at 629-30.
17 See Steblay, supra note 84, at 288-89; Wells et al., Eyewitness identification Procedures, supra note
68, at 629.
8 See, e.g., Sonenshein & Nilon, supra note 69, at 274; Wells et al., Eyewitness Identification
Procedures, supra note 68, at 635; Yob, supra note 25, at 225-26.
See, e.g., Amy Bradfield Douglass & Nancy Steblay, Memory Distortion in Eyewitnesses: A Meta-
Analysis of the Post-Identification Feedback Effect, 20 APPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 859 (2006); Jeffrey
S. Neuschatz et al., The Effects of Post-Identification Feedback and Age on Retrospective Eyewitness Memory,
19 APPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 435, 441 (2005) (describing effects of post-identification
confirming feedback); Wells et al., Eyewitness Identification Procedures, supra note 68, at 626; Gary L.
Wells & Amy L. Bradfield, "Good, You Identified the Suspect Feedback to Eyewitnesses Distorts Their
Reports of the Witnessing Experience, 83 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 360 (1998); Wells & Quinlivan, supra
note 62, at 12.
9' See, e.g., Wells & Bradfield, supra note 89, at 362; Douglass & Steblay, supra note 89, at 864-65.
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witness's subsequent contacts with others involved in the case, and of a witness's
likely increasing confidence in her identification as she sees the government
continuing to build a case against the suspect through further investigation and
prosecution.
Crucially, each of the measures I have discussed unequivocally reduces the
chances of misidentification without significantly affecting the likelihood that
witnesses will accurately identify the actual criminal when the perpetrator is
present. 91  A variety of other practices also reduce the likelihood of
misidentification. Scientists have recommended separating witnesses from each
other during identification procedures to reduce the odds that they will influence
each other's choices. 92 Scientists have also urged administrators to avoid presenting
a suspect to any witness on more than one occasion. 93 To reduce the chances that a
witness will choose an innocent suspect, scientists have also argued that police
should include only one suspect at a time in any given procedure. 94 Additionally,
police should construct lineups and photo arrays with adequate numbers of fillers.95
Finally, some experiments have suggested that presenting participants in
identification procedures to witnesses sequentially, rather than simultaneously, can
reduce the odds of misidentification.96 With sequential presentation, witnesses are
likely to compare each participant individually to their memories of the perpetrator,
eliminating innocent participants rather than using the relative judgment process to
compare all participants to each other and choosing the one who seems closest to
the actual criminal. 97  However, while research suggests that sequential
identification procedures produce fewer misidentifications, that same research
shows that sequential presentation also results in fewer accurate identifications.9" If
the higher rate of accurate identifications for simultaneous lineups results only from
guessing, then there would be no reason to recommend simultaneous presentation
9' See Wells et al., Eyewitness Identification Procedures, supra note 68, at 627-36.
92 See, e.g., Kenneth A. Patenaude, Preventing Misidentifcation by Utilizing New Techniques, in
ADAPTING TO NEW EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION PROCEDURES: LEADING EXPERTS ON
CHALLENGING TRADITIONAL PROCESSES AND INTEGRATING NEW TECHNIQUES 67-68 (2010);
OToole & Shay, supra note 25, at 117. Cf Elizabeth F. Loftus & Edith Greene, Warning: Even
Memory for Faces May be Contagious, 4 LAW & HUM. BEHAv. 323, 323-28, 333 (1980) (finding that
witness recollection of identifying features is influenced by the recollections of other witnesses).
13 Cf. Wells & Quinlivan, supra note 62, at 8 (noting the potentially suggestive influence of multiple
presentations of the suspect).
9' See id. at 7.
9' Increasing the number of fillers decreases the odds that a witness will use the relative judgment
process to identify an innocent suspect. Gary L. Wells, Police Lineups: Data, Theory, and Policy, 7
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y &L. 791, 798 (2001). While scientists have not agreed on any "magic number"
that should be required in all cases, many have suggested a minimum of five fillers. State v. Henderson,
27 A.3d 872, 898 (NJ. 2011) (quoting testimony from Professor Gary Wells).
96 See Nancy Steblay et al., Eyewitness Accuracy Rates in Sequential and Simultaneous Lineup
Presentations:. AMeta-Analytic Comparison, 25 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 459, 468 (2001).
97 See id. at 468-69.
" See id. at 466, 468-69.
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over sequential presentation. 9 Nonetheless, some scientists remain unconvinced
that sequential presentation is the "active ingredient" leading to lower rates of
misidentification in studies purporting to show that effect.' °
Unfortunately, despite widespread scientific consensus about many of the
system variables that impact reliability, the legal response to that science has been
inadequate. Although the Supreme Court's eyewitness jurisprudence has referred to
"unnecessarily suggestive" identification procedures, 1° 1 the Court has provided very
little guidance for lower courts on the kinds of techniques that increase the odds of
misidentification. As a consequence, as I have catalogued in a previous article,
federal courts applying Manson have regularly failed to recognize the problematic
aspects of suggestive procedures."0 2 As I will show in this article, even among states
that have rejected Manson or that have passed legislation that might inform judicial
analysis in applying Manson, courts regularly fail to characterize unreliable methods
as unnecessarily suggestive.
B. Estimator Variables
The Manson reliability factors represented the Supreme Court's attempt to
address some of the estimator variables that impact the trustworthiness of
identification evidence. Yet the reliability factors the Manson Court invoked are
both flawed and incomplete. First, three of the five factors-opportunity to view,
degree of attention, and confidence1 3-are largely subjective, self-reporting factors.
As I have noted above, suggestion is likely to inflate a witness's certainty in her
identification. Similarly, a witness exposed to suggestion is likely to have a
subsequently inflated memory of the quality of her opportunity to view the
perpetrator at the time of the crime and of the degree of attention she paid to the
criminal at the time of the crime.0" Thus, the Manson analysis has tended to create
a sort of perverse feedback loop, in which the Manson factors seem to reinforce the
reliability of the most suggestive procedures.
10 5
9 See id. at 469.
155 Roy S. Malpass et al., Public Policy and Sequential Lineups, 14 LEGAL & CRIMINOLOGICAL
PSYCHOL. 1, 5-6 (2009); see also Dawn McQuiston-Surrett et al., Sequential vs. Simultaneous Lineups:A
Review of Methods, Data, and Theory, 12 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 137, 163-64 (2006); Scott D.
Gronlund et al., Robustness of the Sequential Lineup Advantage, 15 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.:
APPLIED 140,149 (2009).
101 See, e.g., Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 110 n.10 (1977).
1 See Kahn-Fogel, Manson andlts Progeny, supra note 4, at 196,211-12.
o Manson, 432 U.S. at 114.
154 See Neuschatz et al., supra note 89, at 441; see also Wells et al., Eyewitness Identifications
Procedures, supra note 68, at 626; Wells & Bradfield, supra note 89, at 361-62; Wells & Quinlivan, supra
note 62, at 9-12; see generally Douglass & Steblay, supra note 89 (discussing research "on the integrity of
an eyewitness's recollections after the line-up decision is made").
" See Kahn-Fogel, Manson andIts Progeny, supra note 4, at 189.
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Even in the absence of any suggestion whatsoever, the Manson factors bear a
complicated relationship to accuracy. First, even with impeccable identification
procedures, certainty bears only a moderately positive correlation with accuracy.1° 6
Yet people not educated about eyewitness science are likely to attach enormous
significance to a witness's certainty.' When a witness has been exposed to
suggestion, moreover, the witness's artificially altered self-assessment can destroy
the diagnostic value a confidence inquiry might have had in the absence of
suggestion.1° And although the Manson Court referred to certainty "at the
confrontation,""° courts applying Manson have regularly assessed confidence based
on the witness's subsequent testimony, when suggestion, including the very
geography of the courtroom, is likely to have inflated the witness's certainty
artificially." 0
Although suggestion does not tend to inflate some aspects of a witness's
description of her opportunity to view, including the duration of the event and the
distance between the witness and the perpetrator,'1 ' witnesses tend to overestimate
the amount of time they had to view the criminal even without suggestion." 2
Finally, even without suggestion, a witness's degree of attention at the time of a
crime relates to accuracy in ways that judges not trained in the science are unlikely
to understand. A witness who pays a great deal of attention to a criminal's
"o See, e.g., Robert K. Bothwell et al., Correlation of Eyewitness Accuracy and Confidence: Optimality
Hypothesis Revisited, 72 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 691, 691-93 (1987); Wells & Quinlivan, supra note 62,
at 11-12 (describing a meta-analysis of laboratory studies showing that the correlation between certainty
and accuracy could be as high as 0.41 among witnesses who made an identification). See also
Commonwealth v. Gomes, 22 N.E.3d 897, 913 (Mass. 2015) (noting that research on the relationship
"between eyewitness certainty and accuracy is complex and still evolving," and holding that "it is
necessary to inform jurors of the "tenuous relationship"). But see State v. Henderson, 27 A.3d 872, 899
(N.J. 2011) (describing a special master's finding that "eyewitness confidence is generally an unreliable
indicator of accuracy," but also noting the special master's acknowledgment of research suggesting that
"highly confident witnesses can make accurate identifications 90% of the time").
107 See, e.g., Watkins v. Sowders, 449 U.S. 341,352 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting); ELIZABETH F.
LOFTUS, EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY 19 (1979); Brian L. Cutler et al., Juror Decision Making in
Eyewitness Identification Cases, 12 LAW &HUM. BEHAv. 41, 41, 53 (1988); Jennifer L. Devenport et
al., Eyewitness Identification Evidence: Evaluating Commonsense Evaluations, 3 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y &
L. 338, 351 (1997); Wells et al., Eyewitness Identification Procedures, supra note 68, at 620; Heather
Sonnenberg, Note, The Admissibility of Expert Identifcation Testimony in New York Courts According to
People v. Lee, 12 TEMP. POL. &C.R1 L. REV. 231,242 (2002).
o See, e.g., Wells & Quinlivan, supra note 62, at 12 (describing the results of numerous studies).
l Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98,114 (1977).
10 See Kahn-Fogel, Manson and Its Progeny, supra note 4, at 201, 212; see also Commonwealth v.
Crayton, 21 N.E.3d 157, 166 (Mass. 2014) ("Although the defendant is not alone in the court room,
even a witness who had never seen the defendant will infer that the defendant is sitting with counsel at
the defense table, and can easily infer who is the defendant and who is the attorney.").
See Douglass & Steblay, supra note 89, at 864.
u Wells & Quinlivan, supra note 62, at 10; Cf. H. R. Schiffman & Douglas J. Bobko, Effects of
Stimulus Complexity on the Perception of BriefTentporalIntervals, 103 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 156,
158 (1974) (finding that the greater the complexity of a stimulus, the more likely an individual was to
overestimate the length of time that he or she observed it).
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particular facial features is likely to be better at describing those features, but worse
at recognizing the criminal at an identification procedure.113 On the other hand, a
witness who has made a more global assessment of the criminal's face at the time of
the crime is more likely to recognize the criminal later, but less likely to be able to
give a detailed description of his features.
114
Although there is some correlation between the accuracy of an identification
and the consistency of a witness's description with the appearance of the suspect,
that consistency is unlikely to be meaningful if the condition that made an
identification procedure suggestive in the first place was that the suspect was the
only participant who resembled the description of the perpetrator. 115 Finally,
although the lapse of time between the crime and an identification procedure
affects reliability, courts often consider days or even weeks to be relatively
insignificant. 16 However, the research has shown that the most significant
deterioration of a witness's memory occurs within hours of an event." 7
In addition to problematic aspects of the Manson factors themselves, those
factors are woefully incomplete. Since Manson, scientists have identified a large
number of other variables important to any reliability inquiry. Research has shown,
for example, that witnesses are significantly less likely to be able to identify a
perpetrator whose race is different from that of the witness than a perpetrator of
the same race. 18 The stressfulness of an event is also important, but, contrary to
popular wisdom, highly stressful events tend to impair memory rather than to
reinforce it.119 Additionally, when a perpetrator brandishes a weapon during a
crime, witnesses are likely to focus their attention on the weapon instead of the
perpetrator and less likely to make accurate identifications afterward." Numerous
113 SeeWells & Quinlivan, supra note 62, at 10-11.
114 Id. at 11.
115 See id. at 13.
116 E.g., State v. Henderson, 77 A.3d 536, 546 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2013) (finding trial
judge's determination that two-week delay between crime and identification was "a "relatively short
span" to be adequately supported by the evidence and upholding decision to admit eyewitness evidence).
117 See Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 131 (1977) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (asserting that "the
greatest memory loss occurs within hours after an event"); Carol Krafka & Steven Penrod, Reinstatement
of Context in a Field Experiment on Eyewitness Identification, 49 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 58,
65 (1985) (finding that the most substantial increase in misidentifications from target-absent photo
arrays occurs two hours after initial confrontation); Lisa Steele, Trying Ident/ifcation Cases: An Outlinefor
Raising Eyewitness ID Issues, THE CHAMPION, Nov. 2004, at 8, 10 n.14 (citing David C. Rubin & Amy
E. Wenzel, One Hundred Years of Forgetting: A Quantitative Description of Retention, 103 PSYCHOL.
REv. 734 (1996)).
"' See Christian A. Meissner &John C. Brigham, Thirty Years of Investigating the Own-Race Bias in
Memoryfor Faces:A Meta-Analytic Review, 7 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & LAW 3, 21 (2001).
119 See, e.g., Kenneth A. Deffenbacher et al., A Meta-Analytic Review of the Effects of High Stress on
Eyewitness Memory, 28 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 687, 687, 699 (2004).
" See Nancy Mehrkens Steblay, A Meta-Analytic Review of the Weapon Focus Effect, 16 LAW &
HUM. BEHAV. 413, 413, 415-17 (1992) (finding a decrease in eyewitness accuracy by about 10 percent
when a weapon is present).
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other variables not included in the Manson factors also impact reliability."' Even
though the Manson Court itself described its reliability factors as merely guidelines
in a totality-of-the-circumstances analysis, 2 2 in practice, courts applying Manson
rarely go beyond those factors.' 23 As I will discuss below, with notable exceptions,
even states that have rejected Manson have failed to guide judges on the range of
variables that should inform analysis of the reliability of identification evidence.
Overall, then, even among jurisdictions that have made efforts to reform their
eyewitness law, judges have given insufficient weight to both the police techniques
that reduce accuracy and the factors outside the control of law enforcement that
impact reliability.
C. Alternatives to Suppression.'Jury Instructions and Expert Testimony
Given the low likelihood of suppression under Manson, scientists have also
examined the efficacy of measures designed to educate jurors tasked with evaluating
eyewitness evidence. In particular, researchers have devoted attention to the
potential benefits of jury instructions and expert testimony on the factors that
impact the reliability of eyewitness evidence. First, scientists have demonstrated the
need to educate jurors by showing that lay people tend to assess eyewitness
evidence based on factors that have little or no relationship to actual reliability.'24
To the extent that jury instructions and expert testimony can counter these
tendencies, the failure of courts to suppress unreliable evidence may be less
problematic. Unfortunately, however, the jury instructions that federal courts
commonly issue fail to include sufficient detail to apprise jurors of the range of
factors that affect reliability. Furthermore, available evidence suggests that even the
best instructions and detailed expert testimony have limited potential to influence
juror decision-making.
First, a jury instruction without a detailed explanation of the kinds of factors
that impact reliability is unlikely to counter jurors' tendencies to use unsound
reasoning in assessing the evidence. The model instruction from United States v.
Telfaire,1 5 which has become the most widely-adopted instruction on the issue,"
121 See, e.g., Henderson, 27 A.3d at 906-10 (discussing the effects of witness and perpetrator
characteristics including age, influences from private actors, and the speed with which a witness makes
an identification).
122 Manson, 432 U.S. at 113-14.
" See Henderson, 27 A.3d at 919.
124 See generally Devenport et al., supra note 107, at 348-52 (discussing studies showing juror
insensitivity to estimator variables that reduce reliability and over-reliance on witness confidence and
memory for peripheral details, the general tendency of jurors to overestimate eyewitness accuracy, and
the inability of jurors to apply commonsense knowledge concerning lineup suggestion to the facts of
cases they decide).
125 United States v. Telfaire, 469 F.2d 552, 558-59 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
126 Derek Simmonsen, Comment, Teach Your Jurors Well: Using Jury Instructions to Educate Jurors
About Factors Affecting the Accuracy of Eyewitness Testimony, 70 MD. L. REV. 1044, 1070 (2011) (citing
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deals primarily in generalities concerning the witness's opportunity and capacity to
view the perpetrator and potential suggestion in the identification procedure.
127
Aside from noting that a procedure in which the witness picks the defendant from
a group of similar individuals is generally superior to a showup, 128 the Telfaire
instruction includes no guidance on the kinds of variables that reduce the reliability
of identification procedures, and it contains no reference to most of the estimator
variables scientists have since identified as important to reliability determinations.
Unsurprisingly, mock jury studies have shown the Telfaire instruction to be
ineffective as a safeguard against misidentification. 129
Yet there are reasons to believe that even the most detailed instructions might
be insufficient to cause jurors to incorporate fully the results of scientific research
into their decision-making. A cautionary instruction buried in a comprehensive
charge might be lost on jurors who have been through a long, tiring trial, and it
could be insufficient to counter the prejudicial effects of eyewitness testimony
jurors have heard significantly earlier in the process.1 30 Some research has shown
that detailed jury instructions on eyewitness evidence can be effective at least in
reducing the number of pre-deliberation verdicts, suggesting that such instructions
cause jurors to exercise greater caution in their assessment of the evidence. 131
Nonetheless, this research has not demonstrated superior outcomes with detailed
instructions, and leading scientists have concluded that it remains an "open
question" whether detailed instructions can have a significant impact on juries. 132
Moreover, it is possible to extrapolate from the results of research on the efficacy of
expert testimony to conclude that detailed instructions might have similarly limited
value.
The use of expert witnesses to inform jurors of the pitfalls of eyewitness
identification could ameliorate the problems of jurors paying insufficient attention
to eyewitness instructions that are part of a much larger charge and of such
instructions being insufficient to counter prejudicial testimony jurors heard at a
much earlier time. Furthermore, research on the use of experts suggests that expert
testimony can increase juror sensitivity to the significance (or lack thereof) of
factors such as eyewitness confidence, violence, and weapon focus.' 33 However,
Tanja Rapus Benton et al., On the Admissibility of Expert Testimony on Eyewitness Identficatior" A Legal
and Scientific Evaluation, 2 TENN. J.L. & POL'Y 392, 422 (2006)).
127 See Telfaire, 469 F.2d at 558.
12
8 Id.
"2 Wells & Quinlivan, supra note 62, at 20 (citing BRIAN L. CUTLER & STEVEN D. PENROD,
MISTAKEN IDENTIFICATION: THE EYEwITNESS, PSYCHOLOGY, AND THE LAW 255-64 (1995)).
'30 See Peter J. Cohen, How Shall They be Known?." Daubert v. Merrill Dow Pharmaceuticals and
Eyewitness Identification, 16 PACE L. REV. 237, 272 (1996).
131 See Jules Epstein, The Great Engine that Couldn t: Science, Mistaken Identifications, and the Limits
of Cross-Examination, 36 STETSON L. REV. 727, 783 n.234 (2007) (citing CUTLER & PENROD, supra
note 129, at 257).
112 Wells & Quinlivan, supra note 62, at 20-21.
133 See Devenport et al., supra note 107, at 356.
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experiments with mock juries have also shown that such testimony does not
enhance juror sensitivity to variables related to the suggestiveness of identification
procedures. 134 While not directly applicable to the efficacy of jury instructions, this
research might also suggest a likelihood of similarly limited value of detailed
instructions. Ultimately, both expert testimony and detailed jury instructions may
have some limited value in helping juries more skillfully gauge the reliability of
eyewitness testimony. Nonetheless, the available data suggest that neither of these
devices is sufficient to counter the range of intuitive, yet incorrect, ideas that jurors
have about eyewitness evidence.
11. STATE APPROACHES TO EYEWITNESS LAW
As noted above, state-based eyewitness identification reform has taken several
basic forms. First, although the vast majority of jurisdictions have followed Manson,
a few states have explicitly rejected Manson in interpreting the due process
requirements of their own constitutions. In Manson's place, these states have
crafted a variety of norms that their respective supreme courts believed would better
protect against the use of suspect identification evidence. Second, some state
supreme courts have taken steps to ensure that juries will have the tools to evaluate
eyewitness evidence adequately when judges decline to suppress it, a small number
of jurisdictions have required detailed instructions to advise jurors of the ways
system and estimator variables can influence the accuracy of eyewitness evidence,
and some have expressed a preference for the admissibility of expert testimony on
the issue. Finally, some states have enacted statutory mandates that law
enforcement personnel conduct eyewitness identification procedures in ways that
are consistent with scientific discoveries about the most reliable ways to administer
such procedures.
My analysis will focus on both the textual content of judicial and legislative
directives and on the ways those directives have influenced courts examining the
admissibility of eyewitness identification evidence. Because of the multiplicity of
state approaches to eyewitness identification reform, including a variety of
constitutional tests, a range of judicially imposed evidentiary protections, disparate
statutory provisions, and an array of combinations of such reforms, much of my
analysis will be state by state rather than organized according to categories of
reform. As I have noted, the various kinds of measures a state might adopt,
judicially or legislatively, are potentially interrelated. Given the qualitative nature of
my analysis in this article, it would be impractical to assess the consequences of
only one type of reform if a state has attacked the problem of eyewitness error in
more than one manner and if some of the approaches the state has adopted are
unique. On the other hand, when more than one state has taken essentially the
" Id. at 357.
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same overall approach to eyewitness identification law, I will analyze those
jurisdictions collectively.
I will conclude my examination of state approaches to eyewitness identification
law with a brief discussion of the recent reforms the New Jersey and Oregon
supreme courts have adopted. The decisions in New Jersey and Oregon have
justifiably received a great deal of praise, 135 and there is much merit to the notion
that these opinions should serve, at least to some extent, as models for other states.
My analysis confirms that this is true not only for states that have retained the
Manson standard and failed to implement other reforms, but also for states that
have both rejected Manson and endorsed other safeguards to protect against
wrongful conviction through misidentification. Nonetheless, examination of the
opinions from New Jersey and Oregon reveals reason for apprehension about the
future of eyewitness law, even in those states. Furthermore, the shortcomings of the
incremental improvements and halfhearted refinements other states have espoused
should qualify the excitement with which advocates and scholars have received the
New Jersey and Oregon reforms. The experience of other states reveals the extent
to which the initial promise of appealing reforms has been offset by subsequent
reluctance to embrace the full implications of previous pronouncements on the
manner in which eyewitness identifications should be conducted and assessed.
A. Massachusetts/New York
Massachusetts and New York each have taken steps to reduce the likelihood of
wrongful conviction through eyewitness misidentification. Most prominently, each
state has rejected Manson in favor of an ostensibly more protective rule for
determining the admissibility of suspect evidence. The Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court has also required state law enforcement personnel to conduct some
identification procedures using certain scientifically established protocols for
reducing error. Furthermore, each state has taken some measures to inform jurors
135 See, e.g., Brandon L. Garrett, Eyewitnesses and Exclusion, 65 VAND. L. REV. 451, 493 (2012)
(describing Henderson as providing "an important model" with its "social science framework for
admissibility of eyewitness identifications'); Barry Scheck, Four Reformsfor the Twenty-First Century, 96
JUDICATURE 323, 334 (2013) (describing the New Jersey and Oregon decisions as "landmark decisions"
that have "provided a blueprint for state courts to re-evaluate and revise their legal architecture for the
assessment and regulation of eyewitness testimony"); Trenary, supra note 10, at 1261; Dana Walsh,
Note, The Dangers of Eyewitness Identification: A Call for Greater State Involvement to Ensure
Fundamental Fairness, 36 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 1415, 1415 (2013) (arguing that "[olther states
should follow New Jerseys lead and adopt a similar approach"). But see Carla Jones, A New Age of
Eyewitness Identification Evidence in Light of Modern Scientific Research. Why State v. Henderson Does Not
Significantly Alter the Management of Eyewitness Identfication Evidence, 44 RUTGERS L.J. 511, 513-14
(2014) (arguing that Henderson provides insufficient protection against unreliable evidence because it
continues to rely on "suggestiveness" as a necessary threshold for judicial gatekeeping and because the
courts prescribed reliability analysis offers inadequate deterrence against the use of suggestive
identification techniques).
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of the considerations that impact the reliability of eyewitness evidence.
Nonetheless, as my analysis will show, the steps these states have taken have been
inadequate.
The high courts of Massachusetts and New York have each interpreted their
constitutions as requiring a Stovall-like rule of per se exclusion of evidence from
unnecessarily suggestive pre-trial identification procedures. Stovall, in fact,
explicitly inspired the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts as it explained its
ruling in Commonwealth v. Johnson as a decision to follow the United States
Supreme Court's earlier framework for dealing with the issue, rather than the
Manson standard.136 In People v. Adams, the New York Court of Appeals adopted
the same per se exclusionary rule for unnecessarily suggestive pre-trial identification
procedures. 137 Intuitively, this approach may appear to provide significantly greater
protection against the use of unreliable evidence than Manson; if courts must
exclude all evidence from unnecessarily suggestive identification procedures, rather
than balancing the corrupting effects of such procedures against a set of reliability
factors, the result should be the exclusion of more evidence of questionable
reliability and greater deterrence against the use of unsound identification
techniques by police. In fact, just as those writing about the federal standard have
often criticized Manson as dismantling the protection offered by Stovall, others
have praised Massachusetts and New York as offering a superior alternative to the
federal directive.13 Yet a closer examination of the implications of Stovall calls this
conclusion into question.
There are at least two reasons to suspect that a Stovall-like rule is insufficient to
prevent the introduction of evidence derived from tainted identification procedures.
First, Stovall itself provides almost no guidance to courts on the kinds of
procedures that are likely to lead to misidentification in the first place. 139 Thus,
136 Commonwealth v. Johnson, 650 N.E.2d 1257,1260-61 (Mass. 1995).
137 See People v. Adams, 423 N.E.2d 379, 383-84 (N.Y. 1981).
' See, e.g., Martinis M. Jackson, Note, Timely Death of the Show-Up Procedure: Why the Supreme
Court Sbould Adopt a Per Se Exclusionary Rule, 56 HOW. L.J. 329, 351-55 (2012); John T. Rago, A Fine
Line Between Chaos & Creation: Lessons on Innocence Reform from the Pennsylvania Eight, 12 WIDENER
L. REv. 359, 429-30 (2006) (citing Massachusetts' per se exclusionary rule for unnecessarily suggestive
identifications as an example of "perfectly reasonable thinking" that "Pennsylvania would be well served
to follow"); Calvin TerBeek, A Call for Precedential Heads: Why the Supreme Court's Eyewitness
Identification Jurisprudence is Anachronistic and Out-of-Step with the Empirical Reality, 31 LAW &
PSYCHOL. REv. 21, 50 (2007) (citing Johnson and Adams in claiming that Massachusetts and New York
are among the "more empiricaly-minded state supreme courts" that have rejected Manson); But see
Matthew Gordon, Note, Is New York Achieving More Reliable and Just Convictions when the Admissibility
of a Suggestive Pretrial Identification is at Issue?, 29 TouRo L. REv. 1305, 1330-31 (2013) (questioning
the superiority of New York's per se exclusionary rule for unnecessarily suggestive pre-trial procedures
and noting that under both the New York and federal approaches, an identification in some form might
be allowed notwithstanding an unnecessarily suggestive procedure).
139 See Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 302 (1967). The StovallCourt acknowledged that showing a
suspect singly to a witness for identification had been "widely condemned," but the Court has never
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courts relying on Stovall alone may be unlikely to recognize the problems that
should lead to a conclusion that a procedure was unnecessarily suggestive and
subject to exclusion. Second, although the Stovall Court did not address the
issue, 140 state courts that have modeled their rules on Stovall have allowed for the
possible admission of in-court identification testimony even when unnecessarily
suggestive procedures require the suppression of pre-trial identification evidence.
14 1
Permitting an eyewitness to make an in-court identification severely diminishes any
potential deterrent value such a rule might have against the use of unreliable pre-
trial identification procedures by law enforcement personnel.
As I have noted in previous articles, the inability of courts to recognize
suggestive procedures was evident in the application of Stovall in the nine months
between that decision and the Court's shift in focus away from per se exclusion in
Simmons. 142 During that period, courts interpreting Stovall regularly found that
blatantly unsound procedures were not unnecessarily suggestive. Among the thirty-
one cases available on Westlaw in which state courts cited Stovall in evaluating due
process challenges to eyewitness evidence between Stovall and Simmons, 143 courts
found not unnecessarily suggestive the identification of a woman from a lineup in
which the three other participants were men;14 a witness's identification of
defendants at a showup at which the defendants were the only black men in the
room and were accompanied by a white police officer, 45 the identification of the
defendant at a showup in an interrogation room after watching police officers
interrogate the defendant, 146 a showup identification at a police station seven days
after the crime;147 an identification in which the witness conceded a prosecutor
might have said, 'The next man the police bring through that door will be the man
in those pictures," before the witness made the identification; 148 a showup in a case
in which a police officer told the witness, "We got him," before the witness
addressed other unreliable practices that might render an identification procedure unnecessarily
suggestive. Id.
140 Rosenberg, supra note 25, at 265-66.
141 See, e.g., Johnson, 650 N.E.2d. at 1260 (allowing in-court identification evidence if the
prosecution can prove an independent source by dear and convincing evidence); Adams, 423 N.E.2d at
382 (upholding trial court's determination that in-court identification evidence had an independent
source).
142 Kahn-Fogel, Manson and Its Progeny, supra note 4, at 192-94; Kahn-Fogel, Beyond Manson,
supra note 28, at 304-08.
143 Of eighty-seven state cases available on Westlaw that cited Stovall between the date of that
decision and the Court's decision in Simmons, thirty-one considered directly whether admission of
eyewitness evidence constituted a due process violation under Stovall. Kahn-Fogel, Beyond Manson,
supra note 28, at 306-07.
' State v. Batchelor, 418 S.W.2d 929, 933-34 (Mo. 1967).
141 People v. Brown, 229 N.E.2d 192, 194 (N.Y. 1967).
146 Commonwealth v. Choice, 235 A.2d 173, 174 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1967) (Hoffman, J., dissenting).
147 State v. Hill, 419 S.W.2d 46, 47-49 (Mo. 1967).
141 Fogg v. Commonwealth, 159 S.E2d 616, 621 (Va. 1968).
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identified the defendant; 149 an identification preceded by a police officer's
announcement to the eyewitness that "[w]e got the man"; 5 ° a lineup in which four
of six participants were suspects;151 and a lineup at which an officer told witnesses a
suspect was present. 
152
These cases demonstrate that mere adoption of a per se exclusionary rule is
insufficient without scientifically supported guidance on the kinds of conduct that
increase the odds of misidentification. In some of the above cases, particularly those
involving statements by law enforcement officers affirming the presence of a
suspect at an identification procedure, the deciding courts were operating based on
the common sense notion that such conduct would have little impact on witnesses
and without the benefit of the later research that would disprove that intuitive
conclusion. Nonetheless, my previous catalogue of all federal cases on Westlaw
dealing with the Manson standard between 1977 and January of 2010 shows that
courts applying that standard have also regularly found tainted procedures not
unnecessarily suggestive, and they have continued to do so despite the steady
accretion of new psychological studies showing precisely the kinds of procedures
that increase the chances of misidentification. 153
Even so, one might expect that a court that has both the benefits of modem
science and the demonstrated desire to improve on the Manson test might
consistently and accurately label procedures unnecessarily suggestive when those
procedures both make misidentification more likely and have no countervailing
advantages. However, evaluation of recent decisions by courts applying a Stovall-
like exclusionary rule demonstrates that even with the availability of unequivocal
scientific proof that a technique increases the odds of misidentification, and
without any clear reason why a more reliable approach would have been impractical
under the circumstances, judges in modem Stovall jurisdictions still often find that
shoddy procedures are not unnecessarily suggestive.
An examination of recent Massachusetts cases available on Westlaw that cited
Johnson exposes the nature of the problem as well as the potential for improvement
in the future. Promisingly, the Supreme Judicial Court has taken note of some of
the safeguards scientists have recognized as crucial to reducing eyewitness
misidentification without impairing the ability of eyewitnesses to make accurate
identifications when the actual perpetrator is present. Inspired by the 1999 United
States Department of Justice guidelines, the court in Commonwealth v. Silva-
Santiago stated that in "nearly all circumstances" it expected police conducting
future photo arrays to warn witnesses the perpetrator may not be present in the
array and to ask each witness to state at the time of the identification his level of
149 People v. Harris, 236 N.E.2d 281,282 (IUl. App. Ct. 1968).
'50 State v. Blevins, 421 S.W.2d 263,265 (Mo. 1967).
151 Burton v. State, 437 P.2d 861, 863 (Nev. 1968).
152 Calbert v. State, 437 P.2d 628, 628-29 (Nev. 1968).
13 Kahn-Fogel, Manson andIts Progeny, supra note 4, at 209-16, 221-25.
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certainty in the accuracy of the identification. 5 4 This pronouncement seems to
have had a real impact on the way at least some police departments in
Massachusetts conduct identification procedures. In recent Massachusetts cases
citing Johnson, for example, courts have noted that police officers conducted
identification procedures in accordance with the protocol the Silva-Santiago court
established. 5
5
To date, however, Silva-Santiago's effect on judicial analysis of challenged
evidence has been inadequate to protect against the use of unreliable identification
techniques. This is largely attributable to the Silva-Santiago court's determination
that, at least for the time being, failure to follow its protocol would not require
judges to find the identification evidence impermissibly suggestive and
inadmissible.' 6 In Silva-Santiago itself, the court ruled that the identification
procedures were not unnecessarily suggestive, despite the failure of law enforcement
in that case to warn witnesses the perpetrator might not be present in a photo
array.'5 7 Since then, the court has reiterated that noncompliance with the Silva-
Santiago protocol should not automatically result in suppression of pre-trial
identification evidence. 15 In Commonwealth v. Watson, the court noted that the
trial had taken place before its ruling in Silva-Santiago, the court also restated the
generally limited scope of the holding in the earlier case, emphasizing that the
court had declined to require suppression as a consequence of failure to follow the
procedures it prescribed."5 9 Ultimately, the Watson court decided that "[a]lthough it
would have been better" if the officer administering a photo array had not told the
witness a suspect's photo was included, "that statement did not render the
identification procedure impermissibly suggestive."' 6° Most recently, in 2014, the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court held that an identification procedure is not
necessarily impermissibly suggestive when a police officer tells a witness a suspect
matching the witness's description is present.' 6' Citing earlier opinions, the court
diminished the significance of such statements, and of its own holding in Silva-
154 Commonwealth v. Silva-Santiago, 906 N.E.2d 299,312 (Mass. 2009).
155 Commonwealth v. Caldwell, No. 11-P-1834, 2014 WL 1343283, at *1 (Mass. App. Ct. Apr. 7,
2014) (noting that lineup conducted several months after crime was administered according to the
Silva-Santiago protocol); Commonwealth v. Gray, No. BRCR2009-00583, 2011 WL 2517423, at *4
(Mass. Super. Ct. June 13, 2011) (observing that officers administering a photo array communicated the
substance of the Silva-Santiago protocol to the witness).
156 See Silva-Santiago, 906 N.E.2d. at 312-13.
157 Id. at 311-13.
ss Commonwealth v. Watson, 915 N.E.2d 1052, 1058 (Mass. 2009).
15. Id. In another case, the Supreme Judicial Court addressed more specifically how it would assess
identification procedures conducted before the Silva-Santiago decision. In Commonwealth v. Walker, the
court stated that detectives in the case "cannot be faulted" for failing to follow Silva-Santiago because
that decision was issued after they conducted the identification procedure. Commonwealth v. Walker,
953 N.E.2d.195, 205-06 (Mass. 2011).
1 Watson, 915 N.E.2d at 1059.
161 See Commonwealth v. Meas, 5 N.E.3d 864,873 (Mass. 2014).
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Santiago, by observing that witnesses generally expect a suspect to be present at an
identification procedure in any case.162 These cases reveal the extremely limited
effect on judicial analysis of police failure to follow the Silva-Santiago protocol.
Furthermore, the Supreme Judicial Court has provided no requirement at all
that police follow other scientific guidelines for administering identification
procedures. In Silva-Santiago, the court acknowledged that blind administration of
identification procedures "is the better practice because it eliminates the risk of
conscious or unconscious suggestion."16 3 Yet the Silva-Santiago court noted that it
had never held that failure to use a blind procedure required a finding of
unnecessary suggestion, and, in the case at hand, the court relied on the lack of
evidence that the administrators of the photo array signaled the identity of the
suspect "or otherwise attempted to influence" witnesses in concluding the
procedure was not unnecessarily suggestive. 1"4 Unfortunately, despite having just
recognized the possibility of subconscious suggestion, the court failed to account
for the subtle ways in which such unintentional signaling might influence witnesses
without any evidence of the suggestion being available for the court to assess. In
fact, this sort of subtle, difficult-to-detect, subconscious suggestion is the primary
reason scientists have recommended blind procedures in the first place; researchers
have generally and appropriately assumed that the vast majority of law enforcement
officers who conduct identification procedures do so in good faith, but that an
administrator who knows the identity of the suspect is likely to influence the
outcome of the procedure through inadvertent signaling. 
165
Since Silva-Santiago, Massachusetts courts have continued to find non-blind
administration of identification procedures not unnecessarily suggestive. In 2009,
in Watson, the Supreme Judicial Court again declined to find non-blind
administration of an identification procedure unnecessarily suggestive, stating there
was no indication that the officer consciously or unconsciously conveyed his
knowledge to the witness." 6 In 2011, in Commonwealth v. Lewis, the
Massachusetts Appeals Court held a photo array was not unduly suggestive despite
162 See id. (citation omitted). Although Meas involved a showup and the Silva-Santiago holding
applied explicitly only to photo arrays, the Meas opinion is revealing of the court's general reluctance to
enforce any remedy for failure to follow what it recognized as best practices in Silva-Santiago. In fact,
the Meas court's reliance on the intuitive, but scientifically unsound, notion that statements about a
suspect's presence are minor transgressions because witnesses believe a suspect is present anyway
represents a retreat from the wisdom of the court's reliance on science instead of intuitive fallacy in the
earlier case. Promisingly, at least, the Meas court noted that, in accordance with the policies of the
Middlesex County district attorney's office, the witnesses in the case had received forms advising them
of the possible absence of the perpetrator and telling them they should not feel compelled to make an
identification. Id. at 870. Ultimately, the Meas court noted that the warnings on this form tempered the
effect of the officer's statement that the perpetrator was probably present. Id. at 873.
" Commonwealth v. Silva-Santiago, 906 N.E.2d 299, 311 (Mass. 2009).
16
'd. at 311-12.
165 See, e.g., Wells & Quinlivan, supra note 62, at 7-8.
166 Commonwealth v. Watson, 915 N.E.2d 1052, 1059 (Mass. 2009).
[Vol. 104
2015-2016] PROMISES AND PITFALLS OF EYEWITNESS REFORMS 127
the fact that the officer who administered the procedure knew which photograph
depicted the suspect.1 67 Citing Silva-Santiago, the court also observed there was no
evidence the officer had communicated the identity of the suspect to the
witnesses.168
The fact that the Silva-Santiago court relied on the lack of specific verification
that police had attempted to influence the outcome of the procedure in holding the
non-blind photo array not unnecessarily suggestive in that case is also particularly
ironic in light of the court's separate determination that it would not require police
to make any recording, written or otherwise, of identification procedures. 169 As
researchers have argued for many years, obtaining evidence from actual cases, as
opposed to experiments, of subtle suggestion from non-blind administrators is
difficult precisely because most identification procedures are not recorded, on video
or by any other means.17 ° The Silva-Santiago court's failure to require that police
make a record of identification procedures also reduces the effectiveness of its
charge that police should elicit confidence statements from witnesses at the time of
an identification. The very reason for taking contemporaneous confidence
statements is that witnesses who have been exposed to suggestion are likely to have
inflated post-suggestion certainty and inflated memories of their previous certainty.
In the absence of a record of the pre-trial procedure, unless the administrator has a
perfect memory of events that may have taken place months or years earlier, there
will be no effective means to correct a witness's false memory of how confident she
was at the time of the earlier identification. 171
Finally, lower courts have interpreted Silva-Santiago narrowly as providing no
requirement that police follow any particular set of procedures when conducting
the most suggestive of identification techniques, the showup.172 Although the
Supreme Judicial Court has stated that showup identifications will be considered
unnecessarily suggestive unless police have a "good reason" to conduct the one-on-
one confrontation, 173 the court has taken a relatively permissive approach in its
167 Commonwealth v. Lewis, No. 09-P-592,2011 WL 31083, at *1 (Mass. App. Ct. Jan. 6, 2011).
168 id.
169 See Commonwealth v. Silva-Santiago, 906 N.E.2d 299, 313 (Mass. 2009).
17 See Wells et al., Eyewitness Identification Procedures, supra note 68, at 628.
171 In cases in which there is clear evidence that a witness was less than unequivocally certain of a'
pre-trial identification, the Supreme Judicial Court has recently provided a significant new protection
against the witness making an identification in the inherently suggestive circumstances of the
courtroom, which are likely to infla-e the witness's certainty. In Commonwealth v. Collins, the Court held
that, in such cases, in-court identification will be disallowed unless there is a "good reason" for it.
Commonwealth v. Collins, 21 N.E.3d 528, 536-37 (Mass. 2014).
172 See Commonwealth v. Bethune, No. WOCR2012-01332, 2013 WL 3227611, at *4 (Mass.
Super. Ct. June 11, 2013) ("Although law enforcement, with some encouragement from the courts, has,
for example, adopted procedural safeguards to reduce the suggestivity in the presentation of photo arrays
. . . in the context of one-on-one show-up identifications, the courts have relegated reliability (or
excessive suggestivity) analysis to the backseat, preferring to focus on law enforcement expediency or
'necessity,' as the courts have deferentially defined that term." (citation omitted)).
173 Commonwealth v. Austin, 657 N.E.2d 458,461 (Mass. 1995).
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evaluation of what constitutes an adequate justification for using a showup. In
Commonwealth v. Austin, the court explained that "[e]xigent or special
circumstances are not a prerequisite to such confrontations," 174 and stated that, in
deciding whether police have a "good reason" for a showup, courts should consider
the nature of the crime and concerns for public safety, the "need for efficient
investigation in the immediate aftermath of a crime," and the "usefulness of prompt
confirmation of investigatory information." 171 Since Austin, the Supreme Judicial
Court has made dear that the question of whether police have a good reason to use
a showup does not turn on whether police could have used a more reliable
identification procedure. 176  In the end, as one court recently observed,
Massachusetts courts have "done little to curtail the practice" of one-on-one
identifications. 177 As a consequence, police are generally free to conduct showups,
and the limited holding of Silva-Santiago allows them to do so without issuing
warnings or taking certainty statements. 178
New York courts have also refused to characterize unquestionably unreliable
procedures as unnecessarily suggestive. In People v. Sancbez, for example, an
intermediate appellate court noted the New Jersey Supreme Court's recognition of
the increased likelihood of misidentification when a witness views a second
identification procedure at which the suspect is the only person to reappear from an
earlier procedure, 79 but dismissed the issue with the conclusory observation that
"this court has never rejected the procedure."' That the New Jersey court's
conclusion was based on undisputed scientific evidence seems to have been
" Id. (quoting Commonwealth v. Harris, 479 N.E.2d 690, 692 (Mass. 1985)).
175 Austin, 657 N.E.2d at 461 (citing Commonwealth v. Barnett, 354 N.E.2d 879 (Mass. 1976)).
176 See Commonwealth v. Martin, 850 N.E.2d 555, 561 (Mass. 2006).
" Bethune, 2013 WL 3227611, at *5.
17' Although police in Massachusetts are generally free to conduct showups, an auspicious decision
of the Supreme Judicial Court in December 2014 placed significant limitations on the government's
authority to elicit an in-court identification when police fail to conduct a pre-trial identification
procedure. Describing a first-time, in-court identification as potentially more suggestive than a showup,
the court held that such evidence would be inadmissible unless there is a "good reason" for its admission.
See Commonwealth v. Crayton, 21 N.E.3d 157, 166, 170-72 (Mass. 2014). Such "good reason[s]"
might include cases in which the witness knew the defendant before the crime at issue and cases in
which an arresting officer testifies only to confirm the defendant is the person she arrested. Id. at 170
(citation omitted). The decision is a dramatic rejection of the mainstream approach to the issue; the vast
majority of states regularly allow witnesses to identify defendants in court for the first time. In fact, even
states that have acknowledged the science and attempted to improve on Manson have tended to allow
the practice. See, e.g., State v. Hickman, 330 P.3d 551, 564, 568-71 (Or. 2014); State v. Hollenbeck,
838 N.W.2d 866, *5 (Wis. 2013); State v. Bridges, Nos. 05-11-2686 & 05-11-2687, 2014 WL
2957443, at *8-9 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. July 2, 2014) (finding that Henderson does not restrict the
use of a first-time, in-court identification, but holding that, when there has been no pre-trial
identification procedure and other factors suggest unreliability, courts must grant a defendant's request
for a lineup).
" See People v. Sanchez, 95 A.D.3d 241, 253 (N.Y. App. Div. 2012) (citing State v. Henderson,
27 A.3d 872, 900-01 (NJ. 2011)).
180 Id.
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unimportant to the New York court. Likewise, despite its conclusion that failure to
use blind administration for a lineup rendered the procedure "deficient," a New
York trial court recently held the evidence should not be excluded as unnecessarily
suggestive, noting that New York courts have repeatedly declined to hold that
failure to use blind procedures requires suppression
s18
In at least one case, a New York family court, presiding over a juvenile
delinquency proceeding, relied in part on a detective's failure to warn a witness
about the perpetrator's possible absence from a lineup in concluding the procedure
was impermissibly suggestive."8 2 However, the New York Court of Appeals has
never made such a ruling. And although the Court of Appeals has stated that
showups with civilian witnesses at police stations should generally be suppressed in
the absence of exigent circumstances,"8 3 the court has otherwise failed to provide
detailed guidance to law enforcement on the kinds of procedures it is likely to find
unnecessarily suggestive and inadmissible as evidence.' Furthermore, unlike the
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, the New York Court of Appeals has
never imposed any requirement that law enforcement agencies conduct
identification procedures in any particular manner at all. Although the Supreme
Judicial Court has repeatedly declined to use exclusion as a remedy for violation of
its requirement that police issue appropriate warnings and take contemporaneous
confidence statements, the mere existence of the requirement is likely to result in
compliance in many instances, and, in fact, recent Massachusetts cases suggest that
police have responded to Silva-Santiago by adopting the court's protocol.
85
The forgoing analysis demonstrates the inadequacy of mere adoption of a per se
exclusionary rule triggered by a finding of unnecessary suggestion. If courts
"81 People v. Vizcaino, No. 4177/11, 2013 WL 718647, at *9 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Feb. 27, 2013)
(citation omitted).
112 See In re Royan D., No. DXXXX/04, 2004 WL 784538, at *7 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. Mar. 29,2004).
18 See People v. Duuvon, 571 N.E.2d 654,656 (N.Y. 1991).
184 In some cases, the New York Court of Appeals has expressed disapproval of specific unreliable
practices, but it has not made clear that it would find such practices unnecessarily suggestive in isolation
from other suggestive conduct. For example, in Adams, the court noted the suggestiveness of a showup
at which police had informed witnesses that the men they would view were the suspected robbers.
People v. Adams, 423 N.E.2d 379, 382 (N.Y. 1981). The court also observed that allowing witnesses to
view the suspects as a group risked the possibility they would influence each other's decisions and held
the showup was particularly unfair in the case because suspects were displayed together to witnesses. Id.
However, the court did not state that any of these practices alone, and outside the context of a showup
conducted at the police station several hours after the crime, would subject an identification to exclusion
as unnecessarily suggestive. In fact, New York courts evaluating the admissibility of identification
evidence since Adams have found showups including multiple suspects and involving simultaneous
viewings by multiple witnesses not unduly suggestive. People v. Love, 443 N.E.2d 948, 949 (N.Y. 1982)
(finding not impermissibly suggestive a showup identification at which a witness identified defendant in
the presence of a group of other witnesses); see also People v. Alexander, 226 A.D.2d 548, 549 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1996) (finding showup not unduly suggestive despite simultaneous viewing by two witnesses);
People v. Colson, 148 A.D.2d 626, 626 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989) (finding showup not unduly suggestive
despite police displaying defendants together).
18 See supra text accompanying note 155.
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applying the rule are unwilling to label procedures unnecessarily suggestive even
when such procedures unequivocally increase the likelihood of misidentification
and have no appreciable advantage over more reliable techniques, then the rule
provides no protection to defendants facing the prospect of wrongful conviction
through the introduction of unreliable eyewitness evidence. While this kind of
decision-making may have been understandable in the years before the production
of significant research establishing the ways the administration of identification
procedures can affect reliability, it is difficult to fathom in an era in which courts
have a conclusive body of research available to aid their determinations. It is
particularly incomprehensible in a jurisdiction that has both expressed a desire to
improve on Manson through use of a putatively more protective directive and that
has explicitly recognized the validity of the science detailing the range of practices
likely to result in misidentification.
The second major shortcoming of the Stovall-like approach Massachusetts and
New York have adopted is that both states allow for the possibility of witness
identification of the defendant in open court, even if the pre-trial identification
evidence must be excluded as unnecessarily suggestive. The Stovall Court itself did
not address whether a finding of unnecessary suggestion would require suppression
of both pre-trial and in-court identification evidence, or, alternatively, whether in-
court identification evidence might be adduced despite the need to suppress
evidence from an unnecessarily suggestive pre-trial procedure.18 6 As a result, courts
applying Stovall were split on the issue."8 7
Although the Manson Court would make dear that Manson required a unitary
approach to evaluating the admissibility of all identification evidence, the high
courts of New York and Massachusetts have stated that in cases in which pre-trial
identification evidence must be suppressed, in-court identification is nonetheless
permissible if it is based on a source independent of the unnecessarily suggestive
pre-trial procedure.1 8 8 This poses at least two serious problems. First, the deterrent
"56 See Rosenberg, supra note 25, at 265-66.
187 See id.
'" See Commonwealth v. Johnson, 650 N.E.2d 1257, 1260 (Mass. 1995); Adams, 423 N.E.2d at
382. Brandon L. Garrett has observed that a large number of states have adopted independent source
tests that allow for the admissibility of in-court identification evidence even when pre-trial eyewitness
evidence is excluded. Garrett, supra note 135, at 477. However, in states that purport to follow Manson,
this formulation is almost incoherent and should virtually never actually lead to suppression of pre-trial
evidence and admission of in-court identification evidence. This is so because, if analysis of Manson's
reliability factors leads to the conclusion that pre-trial evidence must be suppressed as unreliable,
analysis of those same factors should lead to the conclusion that any in-court identification must also be
excluded. In fact, Professor Garrett acknowledges that it is rare to find an example of a court
suppressing pre-trial evidence while admitting an in-court identification. Id. Garrett attributes this to
the difficulty of excluding any evidence under Manson. Id. In fact, given the near conceptual incoherence
of excluding pre-trial evidence while admitting in-court identification evidence under Manson, the
phenomenon may be more rare than Garrett acknowledges; in three of the four examples Professor
Garrett offers of pre-trial evidence being excluded while in-court identification was allowed, the result
was achieved only because the jurisdiction did not, in fact, apply Manson's reliability factors to the pre-
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value of per se exclusion is severely diminished if the prosecution may nonetheless
introduce in-court identification evidence. Second, in most cases in which there has
been a suggestive pre-trial procedure, it is extremely difficult to know whether a
witness would have been able to identify a defendant in the absence of exposure to
previous suggestion.
In Manson itself, the Court stated that a per se exclusionary rule for
unnecessarily suggestive identification procedures would provide greater deterrence
than the totality-of-the-circumstances reliability test it ultimately endorsed. 89
Likewise, in rejecting Manson, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
expressed its belief that Manson's totality-of-the-circumstances test for determining
admissibility would provide insufficient deterrence against the use of questionable
identification procedures. 190 Yet the notion that per se exclusion of tainted pre-trial
identification evidence provides significant deterrence against the use of such
procedures is dubious if the prosecution will still be permitted to introduce in-court
eyewitness evidence. In general, it is the defense, not the prosecution, that is most
likely to want to introduce evidence of unreliable pre-trial procedures, which can be
an effective means of impeaching eyewitnesses.' 9 ' Yet as long as the witness is still
allowed to identify the defendant in the courtroom, the prosecution is likely to be
quite satisfied with the result. As both scientists and Supreme Court justices have
observed, "All the evidence points rather strikingly to the conclusion that there is
almost nothing more convincing than a live human being who takes the stand, points
a finger at the defendant, and says, 'That's the one!'"
192
In fact, just as federal courts examining Manson's reliability factors have tended
to admit all identification evidence in most cases in which those courts found
unnecessary suggestion in a pre-trial procedure, 93 courts applying a per se
exclusionary rule to impermissibly suggestive pre-trial identification procedures
have usually chosen not to exclude in-court identification evidence even when
improper police procedures convinced those courts that pre-trial evidence should be
suppressed. In New York, assessment of cases citing Adams between 1981 and 2009
revealed that, out of 250 cases considering suppression of eyewitness evidence,
courts found pre-trial procedures unnecessarily suggestive in ninety-three cases, but
ruled that in-court identification evidence should have been suppressed in only
trial evidence at all, but was one of the jurisdictions that has rejected Manson in favor of per se exclusion
for at least some unnecessarily suggestive pre-trial evidence. See id. at 477 n.124 (citing examples from
Massachusetts, New York, South Carolina, and Wisconsin).
1"9 Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 112 (1977).
19Johnson, 650 N.E.2d at 1263.
191 See Richard A. Rosen, Reflections on Innocence, 2006 WiS. L. REv. 237, 249 (2006).
192 Watkins v. Sowders, 449 U.S. 341, 352 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original)
(quoting LOFTUS, supra note 107, at 19).
193 See generally Kahn-Fogel, Manson and Its Progeny, supra note 4 (finding that federal courts have
suppressed eyewitness evidence in only 18.05% of cases in which the court found an identification
procedure to be unnecessarily suggestive).
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
eighteen of those cases. 194 Thus, even when these courts found that pre-trial
evidence should be excluded, they permitted witnesses to identify the defendant in
court more than eighty percent of the time.1 95 An analysis of cases on Westlaw
between the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court's 1995 decision in Johnson and
2009 revealed that, while fifteen of seventy-seven cases involving consideration of
the admissibility of eyewitness evidence included a determination that pre-trial
evidence was unnecessarily suggestive, courts ruled that in-court identification was
improper in only seven cases. 196
Overall, police in New York should have a good deal of confidence that, even if
they use suggestive identification techniques courts will nonetheless permit
witnesses to take the stand and identify the defendant. Although I examined a
smaller set of Massachusetts cases, the results there suggest that police can usually
expect in-court identification evidence to be admissible despite suggestive pre-trial
procedures as well. Of course, these figures represent only those cases in which
courts found the pre-trial procedure to be unnecessarily suggestive in the first place.
As I have discussed above, courts in both New York and Massachusetts frequently
find irrefutably flawed procedures not unnecessarily suggestive at all, thus paving
the way for the prosecution to adduce all of the identification evidence at trial.
The dose parallel between the frequency with which New York courts find that
a witness has an independent source for an in-court identification and federal
courts find that all identification evidence is reliable notwithstanding unnecessarily
suggestive procedures should be unsurprising; New York courts applying an
independent source test to determine the admissibility of in-court identification
evidence have founded their analysis on the same reliability factors from Manson
that federal courts use to decide the admissibility of all eyewitness evidence. 197 Yet,
as described above, these factors are particularly ineffective determinants of
reliability given the tendency of suggestive procedures to cause witnesses to have
inflated levels of certainty and to have distorted perceptions of the quality of their
opportunities to view the perpetrator and the degree of attention paid to the
perpetrator at the time of the crime.
Promisingly, a New York trial court recently endorsed examination of a broader
range of estimator variables at independent source hearings, in line with the New
Jersey Supreme Court's findings in Henderson.'" Nonetheless, the court's
recommendation was merely to supplement, rather than to replace, the Manson
factors and did not include guidance on the pernicious effect of suggestion on those
'"Id. at 194.
'
95 See id. at 194, 211.
196Id. at 194-95.
197 See, e.g., People v. Williams, 222 A.D.2d 149, 153 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996); People v. Grant, 843
N.Y.S.2d 911, 913 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2007); see also People v. Carter, 457 N.Y.S2d 695, 700-701 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1982).
198 See People v. Chuyn, No. 2707/2010, 2011 WL 6187150, at *14-15 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Dec. 31,
2011).
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factors. Furthermore, while it is auspicious that a trial court has expressed a
willingness to consider scientifically valid reliability factors, the New York Court of
Appeals has not specifically endorsed any amendment to the traditional reliability
test.
199
In Massachusetts, the Supreme Judicial Court has adopted an independent-
source test that should lead to superior results as compared with the Manson
factors. In Johnson, the court approved of factors largely in line with the factors the
Wade Court had discussed for determining whether an in-court identification could
be considered independent of a Sixth Amendment violation. The Johnson court
stated that judges considering whether to admit in-court identification evidence in
the wake of finding that a pre-trial procedure should be suppressed as unnecessarily
suggestive should examine: "(1) The extent of the witness' opportunity to observe
the defendant at the time of the crime; prior errors, if any, (2) in description, (3) in
identifying another person or (4) in failing to identify the defendant; (5) the receipt
of other suggestions, and (6) the lapse of time between the crime and the
identification."
2° °
Because these factors do not include the dubious reliance on certainty or the
witness's self-reported degree of attention at the time of the crime, there is less
potential for a suggestive procedure to affect the subsequent reliability
determination. Though a witness who has viewed a suggestive procedure is also
likely to have an inflated memory of the quality of her opportunity to view the
perpetrator at the time of the crime, opportunity to view is more susceptible to
objective evaluation than purely subjective self-reporting factors like degree of
attention and certainty, some aspects of the witness's opportunity to view the
criminal, like lighting conditions and distance, will, in some cases, be objectively
verifiable. Additionally, although witnesses exposed to suggestion tend to have
subsequently inflated impressions of the overall quality of their opportunities to
view the perpetrator, studies have shown that suggestion does not inflate witnesses'
impressions of some factors related to the overarching inquiry, including the
distance between the witness and the criminal.
201
All in all, Massachusetts' independent source test is dearly conceptually
superior to mere reliance on the Manson factors. Because the Supreme Judicial
Court has placed less emphasis on subjective, self-reporting factors that are likely to
be skewed by suggestion and, thus, to reinforce the most problematic identification
procedures, one should expect, overall, more reliable decision-making than one
would expect from a court applying Manson. However, the Massachusetts approach
199 The Cbuyn court did note, however, that the Court of Appeals has generally endorsed "the need
for courts to be cognizant of the rapidly evolving nature of scientific knowledge of factors affecting the
accuracy of eyewitness identification .... " Id. at *15 (citing decisions addressing the admissibility of
expert testimony on eyewitness identification).
" Commonwealth v. Johnson, 650 N.E.2d 1257, 1260-61 (Mass. 1995) (quoting Commonwealth
v. Botelho, 343 N.E.2d 876, 882 (Mass. 1976)).
20' See Douglass & Steblay, supra note 89, at 863-65.
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still leaves much to be desired. Although the factors mentioned by the Johnson
court do not include the most problematic aspects of the Manson test, the Supreme
Judicial Court has not instructed lower courts to examine the range of estimator
variables (such as stress, weapon focus, and cross-racial identification) that can
affect reliability in considering suppression motions.
Additionally, although the court has taken some steps to guide juries on the
possibility of misidentification once the evidence is deemed admissible, those steps
were, until very recently, inadequate to apprise jurors of the kinds of issues they
should take into account in assessing the strength of the evidence. The Supreme
Judicial Court has stated that when eyewitness identification is an important issue
at trial, courts should give an instruction to jurors "regarding the evaluation of
eyewitness identification testimony" upon request by the defendant.20 2
Furthermore, citing precedent from Utah, the Supreme Judicial Court has required
the exclusion of any reference to certainty in the standard instruction as a factor
juries should consider.2 03 Yet mere omission of certainty from the standard
instruction is insufficient given the court's determination that eliciting testimony
from a witness on his certainty remains permissible, 204 given the great weight jurors
are likely to place on a witness's confidence based on their own intuition,2 05 and
given the court's refusal in 2005 to require judges to include specific information
about the dubious correlation between certainty and accuracy in the standard
instruction. 20
6
Fortunately, the Supreme Judicial Court, in a January 2015 ruling in
Commonwealth v. Gomes, held that trial courts should inform jurors of the tenuous
relationship between certainty and accuracy.20 7 The court also ruled that a new
model instruction should inform jurors that feedback is likely to influence
witnesses' memories, that stress during an event impairs memory, and that a prior
viewing of a suspect at an identification procedure can reduce the reliability of a
subsequent procedure at which the witness views the suspect again. 208 Although the
court is currently seeking comment on a provisional model instruction
incorporating these data before it finally declares the instruction a model, 2°9 the
court's citations to the scientific consensus on the issues it discussed suggest a high
2"5 Commonwealth v. Franklin, 992 N.E.2d 319, 331 (Mass. 2013) (citing Commonwealth v.
Pressley, 457 N.E.2d 1119 (Mass. 1983)).
13 Commonwealth v. Santoli, 680 N.E.2d 1116, 1121 (Mass. 1997).
Commonwealth v. Cruz, 839 N.E.2d 324, 330 (Mass. 2005).
o See, e.g., Brian L. Cutler et al., Juror Sensitivity to Eyewitness Identification Evidence, 14 LAw &
HUM. BEHAV. 185, 189-90 (1990) (finding that mock jurors gave "disproportionate weight to the
confidence of the witness"); Gary L. Wells, Eyewitness Identification Evidence: Science and Reform, THE
CHAMPION, Apr. 2005, at 15 (stating that "people tend to accept the testimony of a confident
eyewitness as dear proof that the identified person is indeed the perpetrator").
" Cruz, 839 N.E.2d at 330-31.
o7 Commonwealth v. Gomes, 22 N.E.3d 897,913 (Mass. 2015).
2
" Id. at 911-16.
29 Id. at 916-17.
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probability each of the reforms it included in its provisional model will be included
in a new model jury instruction. Before Gomes, the court had never explicitly
required incorporation of any of the non-intuitive but evidence-based research on
system and estimator variables into Massachusetts jury instructions. 210 While the
sort of detailed instruction Gomes contemplates is an inadequate substitute for
suppression of unreliable evidence, it is certainly superior to the status quo in
Massachusetts before January 2015. In contrast to the Supreme Judicial Court, the
New York Court of Appeals has not required any special rules whatsoever for
issuing jury instructions in accord with eyewitness science.
Finally, both Massachusetts and New York have encouraged the provision of
information on the variables that affect eyewitness reliability to jurors in some cases
through the use of expert testimony. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
has stated that trial judges generally have discretion to determine the admissibility
of expert testimony on eyewitness identification, but that it may be an abuse of
discretion to exclude such testimony in a case in which there is little or no evidence
that corroborates the eyewitness's identification. 211 Similarly, the New York Court
of Appeals held that "it is an abuse of discretion" for a trial judge to exclude expert
testimony on eyewitness identification in cases in which the outcome "turns on the
accuracy of eyewitness identifications and there is little or no corroborating
evidence connecting the defendant to the crime."
21 2
The decision to favor the admissibility of expert testimony in some cases
represents a real improvement on the nearly unfettered discretion afforded to trial
judges in most federal circuits and a large number of states. 213 It is a dramatic
improvement over the rule of per se exclusion of such testimony in five states and
one federal circuit,214 and over the generally disfavored status of expert testimony
211 Massachusetts' intermediate appellate court did state in 1999 that judges should consider a
request for an instruction on the unreliability of cross-racial identification "with a measure of favorable
inclination to grant it." Commonwealth v. Jean-Jacques, 712 N.E.2d 1150, 1152 (Mass. App. Ct.
1999). Nonetheless, that Court has also tended to find denial of such instructions to be within the
discretion of the trial judge. Id.
21 See Commonwealth v. Bly, 862 N.E.2d 341, 360 (Mass. 2007) (citing Commonwealth v.
Santoli, 680 N.E.2d. 1116, 1119 (Mass. 1997)).
212 People v. LeGrand, 867 N.E.2d 374, 375 (N.Y. 2007).
213 As of 2011, seven federal circuits, twenty-three state high courts, and two lower state courts had
adopted an approach affording virtually unlimited discretion to trial judges on the issue. Vallas, supra
note 2, at 116 n.137.
214 As of 2011, Kansas, Louisiana, Nebraska, Oregon, Pennsylvania, and the Eleventh Circuit
Court of Appeals had rules completely excluding expert testimony on the reliability of eyewitness
identification evidence. Id. at 124. In 2012, however, the Oregon Supreme Court held that traditional
ways of apprising jurors of the pitfalls of eyewitness identification (dosing arguments, cross-
examination, and generalized jury instructions) were inadequate, that many of the variables relevant to
the issue are either outside the ken of the average juror or contrary to common intuition, and that the
use of experts on the issue "may prove vital to ensuring that the law keeps pace with advances in
scientific knowledge." State v. Lawson, 291 P.3d 673, 695-96 (Or. 2012).
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on the issue in other jurisdictions. 215 Even so, these cases have not gone far enough
to ensure that jurors will be aware of the numerous issues relevant to the reliability
of eyewitness evidence that are outside the knowledge of the average person and, in
some cases, are contrary to common intuition. Although the rulings of the high
courts of both states increase the odds that jurors will be educated on the relevant
science in some cases, they leave defendants without assurance of the admissibility
of expert testimony in many cases in which it might prove crucial.216
What makes this standard particularly troubling is the courts' failure to
recognize that the existence of corroborative evidence has no bearing on the jury's
ability to understand the factors that affect the reliability of eyewitness evidence or
on the underlying reliability of the eyewitness evidence in the case at hand.
Although corroborating evidence increases the odds the defendant is actually guilty,
it does not enhance the probative value of the eyewitness evidence in the case any
more than a great deal of corroborative evidence would increase the trustworthiness
of a psychic's pronouncement that he sensed the defendant was the actual
perpetrator. The Manson Court itself implicitly recognized this distinction when it
stated that corroborative evidence in the case played no part in its assessment of the
reliability of the eyewitness identification evidence. 217 As Justice Stevens observed
in his concurrence in Manson, although such additional evidence of guilt would
certainly be germane to an appellate court's harmless error analysis, it is irrelevant
to an initial assessment of the reliability and admissibility of eyewitness
identification evidence. 218 In fact, notwithstanding the clarity of this reasoning in
Stevens's opinion in Manson itself, courts applying Manson frequently cite the
existence of corroborative evidence in holding that eyewitness evidence is or was
admissible, as opposed to determining that its admission was harmless error.219 I
will discuss this sort of analysis in more detail below. In any case, Justice Stevens's
logic is as pertinent to the consideration of the admissibility of expert testimony on
215 See generally Vallas, supra note 2, at 125-28 (discussing state court views on expert testimony
regarding eyewitness identification).
216 Massachusetts' decision in Gomes, of course, suggests that, in the future, jurors in that state will
be apprised through instructions of important variables affecting eyewitness reliability even when they
do not hear expert testimony on the issue. Commonwealth v. Gomes, 22 N.E.3d 897, 900, 916-18
(Mass. 2015). Nonetheless, jury instructions may be less effective than expert testimony for several
reasons. State v. Clopten, 223 P.3d 1103, 1110 (Utah 2009). First, jury instructions issued "at the end of
what might be a long and fatiguing trial, and buried in a large overall charge'" might be lost on juries. Id.
(quoting Cohen, supra note 130, at 272). Second, such instructions might come too late to counteract
the effects of testimony of a confident eyewitness the jury heard days before the issuance of instructions.
Id. at 1110-11. Finally, even the most detailed instructions tend to deal with scientific evidence only in
general terms, and may be less effective than expert testimony tailored to the facts of the case. Id
217 Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 116 (1977).
21SId. at 118 n.* (Stevens, J., concurring).
219 Rudolph Koch, Note, Process v. Outcome: The Proper Role of Corroborative Evidence in Due Process
Analysis of Eyewitness Identification Testimony, 88 CORNELL L. REv. 1097, 1101 (2003) (noting that the
First, Fourth, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits include assessment of general corroborative evidence of a
defendant's guilt in their analysis of the reliability of eyewitness identification evidence).
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eyewitness evidence as it is to the determination of the admissibility of the
eyewitness identification evidence itself.
Overall, Massachusetts and New York have improved somewhat on the federal
approach to eyewitness law, but neither state has done enough to protect against
the risk that juries will rely on suspect evidence to convict innocent defendants.
Although per se exclusion of unnecessarily suggestive pre-trial identification
procedures does not, in itself, offer significantly more protection against the
possibility of wrongful conviction based on misidentification than the Manson
standard, the high courts of both states have given at least some guidance on the
kinds of procedures police should avoid. Nonetheless, this guidance has been
limited. Beyond its determination that showups with civilian witnesses at police
stations are generally unnecessarily suggestive, 220 the New York Court of Appeals
has left courts to decide on an ad hoc basis whether challenged procedures are
improper. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court has stated that showups are
unnecessarily suggestive unless police have a "good reason" for using the
procedure, 22 1 and it has directed police to implement some research-based
identification techniques. 222 Nonetheless, the Supreme Judicial Court has
ultimately taken a permissive approach to evaluating showup identifications, and it
has consistently refused to find failure to adhere to its required protocol for photo
arrays to be unnecessarily suggestive. If courts are unwilling to find indisputably
unreliable and unnecessary procedures to be unnecessarily suggestive, then a per se
rule of exclusion for impermissibly suggestive procedures is of little use.
Moreover, even when courts in Massachusetts and New York do find
procedures to have been improper and subject to exclusion, the potential admission
of in-court identification testimony reduces the efficacy of the per se rule. In New
York, the use of Manson's reliability factors in this analysis makes it likely that
courts will find that eyewitnesses exposed to the most suggestive procedures
nonetheless have an independent basis for their in-court identifications; review of
actual cases demonstrates that New York courts admit in-court identification
testimony in the vast majority of cases in which they rule that a pre-trial procedure
was improper. In Massachusetts, the Supreme Judicial Court's independent source
factors are superior to the Manson factors, but the court has failed to supplement
the test it derived from Wade with the variety of system and estimator variables
scientists have identified as relevant to any reliability determination. Finally,
although both states have expressed a preference for the admission of expert
testimony in some cases, and although Massachusetts has now crafted a provisional
model instruction incorporating valuable scientific research on eyewitness
reliability, neither state has done enough to ensure juries will be aware of relevant
system and estimator variables when they evaluate evidence that judges have
220 See People v. Duuvon, 571 N.E.2d 654, 656 (N.Y. 1991).
221 See Commonwealth v. Austin, 657 N.E.2d 458, 461 (Mass. 1995).
222 See Commonwealth v. Silva-Santiago, 906 N.E.2d 299, 312 (Mass. 2009).
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determined to be admissible. And, as noted above, even the use of detailed jury
instructions and regular admission of expert testimony are imperfect substitutes for
exclusion of tainted evidence. When judges fail to take all relevant science into
account in adjudicating suppression motions, they abdicate their responsibilities to
protect defendants from wrongful conviction through the use of unreliable
evidence.
Ultimately, the fact that the high courts of Massachusetts and New York have
eyewitness science on their radar, and that each court has expressed a desire to
improve on the federal standard, is promising. There is reason to hope these courts
will be receptive to further reform in the future. However, the ambivalence of these
courts' commitments to science-based norms is apparent in their respective failures
to incorporate the fill implications of the results of the past generations of
psychological data into their decision-making. This ambivalence is perhaps most
apparent when juxtaposing the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court's
requirements that police warn witnesses about possible perpetrator absence and
take contemporaneous confidence statements with the court's refusal to impose any
consequences for failure to adhere to the mandate. Unfortunately, this lukewarm
dedication to improvement has been characteristic of several other jurisdictions that
have attempted to address the problem of eyewitness misidentification as well.
B. Wisconsin
Like Massachusetts and New York, Wisconsin has followed Stovall in adopting
a per se exclusionary rule in interpreting the due process requirements of its
constitution, and like those states, Wisconsin has received considerable praise for
its efforts at reform.2" In justifying its rejection of Manson, the Wisconsin
Supreme Court invoked the previous decade of research demonstrating that
eyewitness misidentification is the most common cause of wrongful conviction and
that eyewitness testimony is "often 'hopelessly unreliable.'" 224 In so doing, the court
also provided significant guidance to law enforcement on the best ways to
administer an identification procedure. 2 5 Like Massachusetts, moreover, some
Wisconsin courts have, in some circumstances, used the independent source test
from Wade, which does not include reference to certainty, in determining whether a
witness has an independent source for in-court identification in the wake of
223 See, e.g., Kruse, supra note 10, at 689-90 (stating that Wisconsin "responded to the social
scientific literature" in jettisoning the flawed federal test, and that Wisconsin's test is "well-designed to
promote compliance with the internal written policies of local agencies"); Rago, supra note 138, at 430
(citing Wisconsin's approach as an example of "perfectly reasonable thinking" that Pennsylvania would
be "well served to follow").
14 State v. Dubose, 699 N.W.2d 582, 591-92 (Wis. 2005) (quoting Commonwealth v. Johnson,
650 N.E.2d 1257, 1262 (Mass. 1995)).
'2' See iid. at 594.
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exposure to unnecessary suggestion.2" Furthermore, Wisconsin's legislature has
passed a statute requiring law enforcement agencies to adopt written policies for
conducting eyewitness identification procedures, directed that such policies must be
designed to reduce misidentification, and specifically recommended use of blind
administration, sequential presentation, and recording of identification procedures
and their results. 227 Even before the legislature took action on the issue, the
Wisconsin Attorney General's office had promulgated a model policy incorporating
major recommendations by eyewitness scientists, including blind administration,
warnings, recording of contemporaneous confidence statements, and preventing
witnesses from viewing the same suspect in more than one procedure.
2 28
Given the state supreme court's recognition of the unreliability of eyewitness
evidence, the court's stated commitment to reducing wrongful conviction through
eyewitness misidentification, and the explicit guidance from the court and from the
legislature on some best practices for conducting identification procedures, one
might expect high-quality judicial decision-making by Wisconsin courts. However,
as with New York and Massachusetts, examination of recent opinions in Wisconsin
reveals frequently disappointing results. First, Wisconsin's rule of per se exclusion
applies only to unnecessarily suggestive, in-person, pre-trial showups and not to
any other kind of identification procedure.229 Thus, its effect is limited.
Additionally, although the Wisconsin Supreme Court has implied that Wade's
independent source test might be the standard for evaluating the admissibility of
in-court identification evidence in the wake of exclusion of evidence from an
unnecessary showup, lower courts have, at times, continued to invoke the Manson
factors as the proper measure of reliability even in these limited circumstances. 
3 0
And, as in Massachusetts, even if the Wisconsin Supreme Court ultimately makes
clear that Manson should not guide independent source inquiries in the wake of
findings of unnecessary showups, or reliability inquiries in the wake of any
impermissible suggestion, the Wade factors are insufficient, without further
elaboration, to guide judges on the array of variables that impact reliability. Finally,
Wisconsin courts have essentially disregarded legislative wisdom on best practices
for conducting identification procedures, and when they have confronted that
wisdom directly, they have discounted it as inconsistent with judicial precedent.
226 E.g., iid. at 596.
227 WIS. STAT. ANN. § 175.50 (West, Westlaw current through 2015 Act 54).
228 See generally POLICE EXEC. RESEARCH FORUM, A NATIONAL SURVEY OF EYEWITNESS
IDENTIFICATION PROCEDURES IN LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES 24-25 (2013),
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffdesl/nij/grants/242617.pdf (discussing Wisconsin Attorney General's Office
model policy).
229 See State v. Hibl, 714 N.W.2d 194,201 (Wis. 2006).
230 See, e.g., State v. Brown, No. 2008AP888, 2009 WL 305508, at *8-9 (Wis. Ct. App. Feb. 10,
2009) (stating that the Manson/Biggers factors "go to [the] reliability of an identification that follows an
impermissibly suggestive out-of-court confrontation, such as a show-up").
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The Wisconsin Supreme Court's decision in State v. Dubose in 2005 was full of
promise for the future of the state's treatment of eyewitness evidence. In Dubose,
the court invoked Stovall and stated that, because of the inherently suggestive
nature of showup identifications and the demonstrated unreliability of eyewitness
testimony, evidence from a showup would be inadmissible unless the showup was
necessary. 1 The court went on to rule that showup identifications are unnecessary
unless the police lack probable cause for arrest or police are unable to use more
reliable procedures due to other exigent circumstances. 2 This alone represents
greater protection against the use of the most suggestive identification procedure
than that offered by the high court of Massachusetts, which has made dear that
exigent or special circumstances are not necessary to justify a showup,233 and by
New York, which has limited only the use of stationhouse showups.3 4
Additionally, the Dubose court stressed that, even if a showup is necessary, "special
care must be taken to minimize potential suggestiveness." 235 Thus, the court stated
that police administering showups should tell witnesses the perpetrator may or may
not be present and should not present a suspect to a witness for identification more
than once.
236
However, since Dubose, the court has made dear that its ruling applies only to
in-person, pre-trial showup identifications. 237 The Dubose court itself emphasized
that it was not adopting the general rule of per se exclusion for all unnecessarily
suggestive pre-trial procedures, but, rather, was endorsing per se exclusion only of
unnecessary showups. 23 In 2006, in State v. Hibl, the court acknowledged that the
Dubose court had relied "on research that potentially implicates all eyewitness
identifications," but concluded the Dubose "court's holding was more circumspect,"
stressing again that Dubose applied only to police-arranged showup identifications
and not to accidental confrontations. 9 Since Hibl, lower courts in Wisconsin have
demonstrated the extremely narrow scope of Dubose. In State v. Hollenbeck, the
Wisconsin Court of Appeals, the state's intermediate appellate court, held that
"s Dubose, 699 N.W.2d at 592-94.
232 Id. at 594.
" Commonwealth v. Austin, 657 N.E2d 458,461 (Mass. 1995).
14 See People v. Duuvon, 571 N.E.2d 654, 656 (N.Y. 1991).
" Dubose, 699 N.W.2d at 594.
236 Id. This aspect of the court's decision has received considerable praise. See, e.g., Thompson, supra
note 9, at 632 (stating that, in contrast to most other state high courts, the Wisconsin Supreme Court
"signaled to lower courts and the police that it would not tolerate practices that did not conform more
dosely to state-of-the-art practices proposed by reformers"). However, as later cases reveal, this portion
of the court's opinion in Dubose seems to be as limited as other lauded components of the nling. See
infra note 239 and accompanying text.
27 See State v. Hibl, 714 N.W.2d 194,201 (Wis. 2006).
23' Dubose, 699 N.W.2d at 594.
239 Hibl, 714 N.W.2d at 201; accord State v. Simmons, No. 2010AP1540-CR, 2011 WL 1485419,
at *3 (Wis. Ct. App. Apr. 20, 2011); State v. Lee, No. 2007AP1636-CR, 2008 WL 2745277, at *3
(Wis. Ct. App. July 16, 2008); State v. Denson, No. 2006AP398-CR, 2006 WL 3783244, at *5 (Wis.
Ct. App. Dec. 19,2006).
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Dubose places no constraint on the admissibility of a showup-like identification at
which a witness identifies the defendant for the first time in court. 240 Additionally,
in 2013, in State v. Wuerzberger, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals stated that
Dubose is inapplicable even to a photo showup, at which police present a witness
with a single photo, as opposed to a live viewing of the suspect.241 Thus, Dubose
imposes no requirement that police have exigent circumstances or any particular
need to show a witness only a single photo of their suspect, as opposed to using a
lineup or a photo array. Using traditional due process analysis, the Wuerzberger
court cited precedent from 1970 for the proposition that photo showups are not
necessarily impermissibly suggestive.24 2  Without further analysis of the
suggestiveness of the procedure in the case, the court went on to hold that, even
assuming the photo showup was impermissibly suggestive, the evidence was
reliable.
243
It is also certainly promising that Wisconsin's legislature has passed a statute
requiring police departments to formulate written policies on eyewitness
identification procedures to reduce misidentification and has recommended use of
blind administration and documentation of each procedure and its results. 2 " The
passage of this statute has likely led to the improved design and administration of
identification procedures around the state.245 Yet its efficacy is reduced by both the
legislature's failure to include any sanction whatsoever for noncompliance and by
the courts' refusal to label noncompliance with these best practices as impermissibly
suggestive.
There are several ways in which Wisconsin's eyewitness statute falls short. First,
the text of the statute provides no direct sanction for police departments that fail to
comply with its requirements. 246 Second, the substantive reforms mentioned in the
statute are listed not as requirements at all, but merely as policies that law
240 State v. Hollenbeck, No. 2012AP2254-CR, 2013 WL 5311471, at *5--6 (Wis. Ct. App. Sept.
24, 2013) (quoting Dubosis definition of a showup as an "out-of-court" procedure).
241 State v. Wuerzberger, No. 2007AP2085-CR, 2008 WL 4057870, at *3 (Wis. Ct. App. Sept. 3,
2008).
242 Id. at *4 (citing Kain v. State, 179 N.W.2d 777, 782 (Wis. 1970)).
243 Id.
244 WIS. STAT. ANN. § 175.50 (West, Westlaw through 2015 Act 54).
245 See, e.g., State v. Scott, No. 2011A.P1285-CR, 2012 WL 6743528, at *2 (Wis. Ct. App. Dec. 27,
2012) (noting that the state's Department ofJustice had developed protocols in response to §175.50).
246 §175.50 (Wesdaw). Like Wisconsin, most other states that have passed eyewitness statutes have
failed to include sanctions for noncompliance. See, e.g., W. VA. CODE ANN. § 62-1E-2 (West, Westlaw
through 2015 Reg. Sess.) (requiring, inter alia, blind administration, warnings, and recording of witness
certainty at the time of an identification, but including no provision for sanction in the event of
noncompliance); People v. Faber, 974 N.E.2d 337, 349 (I1. App. Ct. 2012) (finding that violation of
Illinois statute regulating administration of photo arrays did not require suppression, given that statutory
language did not require suppression as a remedy for noncompliance); Garrett, supra note 135, at 491-
92.
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enforcement agencies "shall consider."247 Furthermore, unlike North Carolina and
Ohio,24 8 the Wisconsin eyewitness identification statute fails even to suggest to
courts that noncompliance should be a factor in determinations on the admissibility
of eyewitness identification evidence.
State v. Scott demonstrates the extremely limited effect of the statute. In that
case, the defendant claimed his counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge the
admissibility of identification evidence obtained as a result of a police officer's
showing a witness photos from a photo array simultaneously instead of sequentially,
failing to warn the witness the perpetrator's photo might not be among those in the
array, and failing to take a contemporaneous statement of certainty from the
witness, which was inconsistent with the protocols the state's Department ofJustice
had developed pursuant to the statute. 249 While the intermediate appellate court
that considered the appeal might have noted simply that the Indiana police officer
who conducted the identification procedure was not bound by Wisconsin's rules, it
held, more broadly, that it could not find the procedures in question improper
because the state supreme court had upheld similar procedures in 1978 and 1981. 2'0
Thus, failure to follow the statute's recommended procedures or the rules the
Department of Justice adopted in response to the statute has been of no
consequence to Wisconsin judges. In the only other Wisconsin case available on
Westlaw to cite the state's eyewitness statute as of the summer of 2014, the Court
of Appeals emphasized that the substantive policies recommended in the statute are
not mandatory.251 Ultimately, in addition to revealing the insubstantial effect of the
statute on judicial analysis, Scott also further exposes the limited effect of Dubose,
not only does Dubos.'s rule of per se exclusion apply only to unnecessarily
suggestive showups, but the state supreme court's requirements for conducting
showups when they are necessary, including the provision of warnings, are
inapplicable to judicial analysis of other identification procedures in the state, based
on decades-old rulings inconsistent with eyewitness science. 252
24 7 Wis. STAT. ANN. § 175.50(5) (Westlaw); see also State v. Drew, 740 N.W.2d 404, 407 n.3 (Wis.
Ct. App. 2007) (observing that, although § 175.50 requires law enforcement agencies to adopt written
policies and to consider certain model rules, it does not mandate the content of the written policies).
241 See infra Part lII.D.
249 Scott, 2012 WL 6743528, at *2.
250 Id. at *3 (citing State v. Mosely, 307 N.W.2d 200 (Wis. 1981); Powell v. State, 271 N.W.2d 610
(Wis. 1978)).
" Drew, 740 N.W.2d at 407 n.3 (observing that, although § 175.50 requires law enforcement
agencies adopt written policies and to consider certain model rules, it does not mandate the content of
the written policies).
252 This should qualify significantly any enthusiasm for the notion that Wisconsin's Supreme Court
has signaled to police that it will view failure to use best practices for eyewitness identification as
unconstitutional. See, e.g., Thompson, supra note 2, at 632 n.178 (stating that the Wisconsin Supreme
Court "actually indicates that anything less than compliance with reform procedures is not likely to be
viewed as constitutional").
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Even when Wisconsin courts do find a pre-trial procedure unnecessarily
suggestive, those courts are likely to admit eyewitness evidence using the Manson
factors to determine reliability. Although some scholarship has described
Wisconsin as modifying its independent source test to eliminate eyewitness
certainty as a consideration, 253 the actual state of the law in Wisconsin is unclear. In
1997, in State v. McMorris, the Wisconsin Supreme Court stated that certainty was
not a proper part of the independent source test for determining the admissibility
of in-court identification evidence in the wake of a finding that pre-trial
identification evidence must be suppressed as a result of a Sixth Amendment
violation.254 Rather, the court noted, the Wade factors should be used to guide that
inquiry.' In Dubose, the court held that in-court identification might be allowed if
based on an independent source, notwithstanding the need to suppress evidence
from an unnecessarily suggestive showup. 256 In so ruling, the court cited
m mcorris.
257
However, the McMorris court itself ruled only that the Manson factors should
not be used to evaluate the admissibility of in-court identification evidence in the
wake of a Sixth Amendment violation. 251 The logic of McMorris reasonably applies
to a Dubose independent source evaluation as well. As the McMorris court noted,
certainty at a pre-trial procedure is part of the Manson test because that test is
meant to assess the reliability of the pre-trial evidence itself.259 Yet the McMorris
court stated that certainty in court is not relevant to a determination of whether an
in-court identification is independent of a constitutionally inadmissible pre-trial
procedure. 260 Citing Wade, the court observed that a witness who has already made
an identification at a lineup is unlikely to "go back on his word later on."26 This
logic applies to consideration of whether in-court identification should be
considered independent of an unnecessarily suggestive showup as well. 2 But
despite the Dubose court's citation to McMorris, and despite the reasonable
application of the McMorris court's logic to Dubose, the Dubose court did not
explicitly state that the Manson factors should not guide independent source
inquiries in the wake of a suppression of an unnecessarily suggestive showup. And
while some courts applying Dubose have used the Wade factors to guide their
's' See id. at 628 (citation omitted).
" State v. McMorris, 570 N.W.2d 384, 392-93 (Wis. 1997).
255 -d. at 393.
256 State v. Dubose, 699 N.W.2d 582, 596 (Wis. 2005).
257 ia.
258 McMorris, 570 N.W.2d at 392-93.
259 Id. at 392.
260 Id. at 393.
261 Id. (quoting United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 229 (1967)).
262 Of course, one might point out that certainty at any suggestive pre-trial procedure is not a good
indicator of the reliability of the pre-trial evidence either, given that the suggestion is likely to have
influenced the witness's certainty at the procedure. However, this notion does not seem to have occurred
to the McMorris court.
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independent source analysis,263 others have stated the Manson factors continue to
govern that assessment. 264 Moreover, neither the McMorris court nor the Dubose
court said anything that would cast doubt on the continued viability of the Manson
factors as a gauge of the reliability of evidence obtained through the use of
impermissibly suggestive identification procedures other than showups, 265 and
nothing the Wisconsin high court has said since McMorris has indicated that
Manson no longer governs reliability inquiries when defendants challenge any
procedure other than a showup as unnecessarily suggestive.
Finally, as discussed above in my evaluation of the law in Massachusetts, even if
the Wade factors were to govern all inquiries about the reliability and admissibility
of identification evidence, this would be insufficient to safeguard against the use of
unreliable evidence. Promisingly, the Wisconsin Supreme Court has noted other
factors, including weapon-focus, stress, and cross-racial identification, that impact
reliability.266 The court expressly approved these factors as among those judges
"may take... into consideration" in exercising a "limited gate-keeping function" in
determining the admissibility of eyewitness evidence under the state's equivalent of
Federal Rule of Evidence 403, which the court said could be a means of excluding
some unreliable identification evidence even in the absence of state-arranged,
unnecessarily suggestive pre-trial identification procedures. 67 However, the court
has not formally added these factors to its independent source analysis under Wade
and McMorris (and possibly Dubose) or to its reliability analysis under Manson.
To make matters worse, like many federal courts, Wisconsin courts applying
the Manson factors have done so in ways that exacerbate the inherent flaws of that
test. For example, in State v. Wuerzberger, the court focused on the witnesses'
certainty that the defendant was the perpetrator when they encountered him at a
jail after having already viewed the defendant's picture at a photo showup. 268
However, the evidence that certainty is likely to increase in the wake of exposure to
suggestion makes reliance on such post-exposure confidence an extremely poor
indicator of reliability. Of course, the suggestiveness of the photo showup itself was
263 See, e.g., State v. Nawrocki, 746 N.W.2d 509, 522-24 (Wis. Ct. App. 2008) (finding a showup
identification impermissible and directing the trial court to use the Wade factors to decide whether in-
court identification was based on an independent source).
26 See, e.g., State v. Brown, No. 2008AP888, 2009 WL 305508, at *3 (Wis. Ct. App. Feb. 10,
2009) (stating that the Manson/Biggers factors "go to reliability of an identification that follows an
impermissibly suggestive out-of-court confrontation, such as a show-up").
s Rather, the court distinguished Manson/Biggers from the inquiry necessary in the wake of a Sixth
Amendment violation. See McMorris, 570 N.W.2d at 393.
2 State v. Hibl, 714 N.W.2d 194,202-03 (Wis. 2006).267 Id. at 205.
'6s State v. Wuerzberger, No. 2007AP2085-CR, 2008 WL 4057870, at *5 (Wis. Ct. App. Sept. 3,
2008).
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likely to have distorted the witness's confidence even at that procedure. 269 But the
Wuerzberger court credited the witnesses' certainty at a time when they had viewed
not one, but two suggestive procedures, and their confidence was likely even fiurther
inflated.270 In one recent case, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals refused to credit a
witness's certainty on the stand after having viewed a showup procedure after the
crime, stating, "[E]xpression of firm belief in court before the jury by the witness
begs the question of how the witness came by that belief."27 ' Yet, more recently,
the same court, in assessing the reliability of identification evidence, gave credence
to a witness's confidence of his identification of the defendant as the defendant sat
at the defense table in court after failing to positively identify the defendant from a
previous photo array.
272
In evaluating challenged eyewitness evidence, Wisconsin courts have also been
susceptible to the pitfall of using corroborative evidence to support the reliability of
an eyewitness's identification, which Justice Stevens warned against in his
concurrence in Manson.273 In State v. Scott, the Court of Appeals asserted that the
fact that the defendant's DNA was on a glove found at the crime scene was 'an
independent indicia of reliability for the identification"" at which the witness had
selected the defendant from a photo array that deviated from statutory
recommendations and the Wisconsin Department of Justice protocol developed
pursuant to the statute.274 As such, the court concluded that any challenge by
defendant's counsel to the admissibility of the identification would have been
unsuccessfil. 275 As I have discussed above, and as Justice Stevens recognized, this
sort of corroborative evidence certainly increased the odds the defendant was
actually guilty, and it might be used to justify upholding a conviction despite a
lower court's admission of tainted eyewitness evidence. However, the Scott court
mentioned this corroborative evidence in examining the likely success of a motion
to suppress identification evidence, based on its assessment of the reliability of that
evidence itself.276 The existence of corroborating evidence does not increase the
reliability of suspect eyewitness evidence and should play no role in determining its
admissibility. This sort of bootstrapping analysis increases the odds of wrongful
conviction.
269 See Wells & Quinlivan, supra note 62, at 12 (citing research demonstrating that procedures in
which a suspect stands out have an inflationary effect on certainty similar to post-identification
confirming feedback).
270 Wuerzberger, 2008 WL 4057870, at *5.
271 State v. Cooper, No. 2007AP1424-CR, 2007 WL 4233004, at *6 (Wis. Ct. App. Dec. 4,2007).
272 State v. Lee, No. 2007AP1636-CR, 2008 WL 2745277, at *4 (Wis. Ct. App. July 16, 2008).
273 Manson v. Braithwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 118 (1977) (Stevens, J., concurring).
274 State v. Scott, No. 2011AP1285-CR, 2012 WL 6743528, at *2-3. (Wis. Ct. App. Dec. 27,
2012).
275 See id. at *3.
276 See id.
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Like Massachusetts, Wisconsin's judiciary has endorsed the scientific research
proving the kinds of system and estimator variables that can increase or decrease
the odds of misidentification. In addition, the legislature has recognized the
wisdom of these data, requiring law enforcement agencies to adopt written
eyewitness identification policies and to consider using some of the demonstrated
methods for reducing misidentification; the Wisconsin Department of Justice has
developed policies incorporating these recommendations, and the result has surely
been the use of more reliable identification procedures in many cases. But despite
some of the sweeping language of Dubose, the Wisconsin Supreme Court has
interpreted the scope of that decision extremely narrowly. Beyond the context of
showup identifications, the court has left lower courts to apply outmoded, unsound
precedent and intuition in evaluating the propriety of identification procedures, and
it has failed conclusively to require lower courts to consider all of the estimator
variables that increase the odds of misidentification when they assess the overall
reliability of identification evidence. Wisconsin courts have also given extremely
limited attention to the state's eyewitness identification statute, and when they have
dealt with the statute directly, they have refused to incorporate its wisdom into
their decision-making, instead relying on decades-old precedent to uphold
scientifically flawed procedures. Unfortunately, in the final analysis, the flash of
wisdom the state supreme court displayed in Dubose seems to have been the
exception to the general rule of judicial abdication of duty in the realm of
eyewitness evidence. This failure to incorporate all implications of incontrovertible
science surely reduces the efficacy of the state's eyewitness statute and its
Department of Justice protocols; police officers and prosecutors engaged in the
often competitive enterprise of law enforcement will have less incentive to use best
practices when the consequences of bolstering the confidence of witnesses and
shoring up evidence against a suspect they believe to be guilty are unlikely to
include exclusion of the tainted evidence.
C. Utah
Utah has also abandoned the federal version of the Manson test, though unlike
Massachusetts, New York, and Wisconsin, it has done so not through adoption of
any Stovall-like rule of per se exclusion of unnecessarily suggestive pre-trial
evidence, but, rather, through modification of the reliability factors used to decide
whether identification evidence is admissible despite the use of an unnecessarily
suggestive procedure. 277 Kansas subsequently followed Utah's lead and adopted the
same test.278 Utah's modification of its due process test for determining the
admissibility of eyewitness evidence followed on the heels of an earlier decision in
which the state supreme court had required use of the same modified reliability
277 See State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 780-81 (Utah 1991).
278 State v. Hunt, 69 P.3d 571,577 (Kan. 2003).
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factors in jury instructions. 279 Like other states that have recognized the results of
scientific studies on eyewitness identification, Utah has received considerable praise
for its improved reliability factors?8 0° Unfortunately, however, Utah's reform efforts
never sufficiently addressed the wealth of scientific data that should inform
eyewitness law in every jurisdiction. Furthermore, a recent Utah decision, the
significance of which has not been recognized in the current body of legal
scholarship, undermines even the relatively modest improvements the Utah
Supreme Court did endorse.
In State v. Ramirez, the state's supreme court invoked the growing body of
scientific proof that the Manson factors are a poor mechanism for assessing
reliability.28 ' The court reiterated its language from an earlier decision, stating that
several of the Manson factors "are flatly contradicted by well-respected and
essentially unchallenged empirical studies," and concluded that "the time has come
for a more empirically sound approach." 28 2 This auspicious sentiment led the court
to conclude that judges assessing state due process challenges to the admissibility of
eyewitness evidence should use a new set of reliability factors, not including the
witness's certainty, and incorporating consideration of the reduced reliability
associated with cross-racial identification.
2 3
Ramirez built on the Utah Supreme Court's earlier decision in State v. Long, in
which the court had sought to ensure that jurors would have adequate information
about the variables that can reduce eyewitness accuracy. In Long, the court ruled
that Utah judges must issue an instruction, listing the same factors the court would
later adopt for due process analysis in Ramirez, to guide jurors anytime defense
lawyers request an instruction in cases in which eyewitness identification is a central
issue. 2" Just as the Ramirez opinion provided a foundation for justifiable optimism
that judges would use scientifically sound analysis in evaluating the admissibility of
evidence, Long gave a real basis to hope that Utah would maintain and expand on
its stated commitment to provide jurors with the tools necessary to gauge the
accuracy of eyewitness evidence in cases in which judges choose not to suppress it.
Nonetheless, even taking Long and Ramirez at face value, the opinions were
insufficient safeguards against contaminated and unreliable evidence. Primarily,
neither case included detailed guidance on the range of system variables that
scientists have identified as crucial to reliability. In fact, contrary to the
psychological research, the Ramirez court said that an officer's statements to
279 See State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483, 492-93 (Utah 1986).
250 See, e.g., Thompson, supra note 9, at 607 (describing Utah's alteration of its reliability test as
among the "path-breaking decisions" of courts that have improved state eyewitness law, which "should
be applauded," but noting that "so much more is needed," even in states that have endorsed reform);
Whitehead, supra note 10, at 649.
281 Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 780.
282 Id. at 780-81 (quoting Long, 721 P.2d at 491).
213 See id. at 781.
24 Long, 721 P.2d at 492-93.
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witnesses before a showup that police had caught someone fitting the description of
one of the robbers "may not of themselves be unnecessarily suggestive."2 5 Neither
case mentioned anything about the benefits of blind administration, identification
procedures, or the issuance of warnings that the perpetrator may be absent and that
investigation will continue even if the witness does not make a positive
identification. No Utah case available on Westlaw since Long and Ramirez has
discussed the advantages of these best practices for identification procedures either.
The court's treatment of estimator variables in Long and Ramirez was better. As
noted above, the Long court stated that cross-racial identification was a factor
courts should consider in assessing reliability.286 Although Long and Ramirez failed
formally to incorporate several relevant estimator variables into Utah's reliability
analysis, including stress and weapon focus, both opinions did mention stress as a
factor that reduces reliability. The Long court noted that a model instruction
including a reference to stress would satisfy the court's requirements, 287 and the
Ramirez court also considered stress relevant to one of the factors it had formally
adopted, the witness's capacity to observe the perpetrator. 8 The court would later
observe that "general cautions" about the effects of stress had become a standard
part of instructions issued pursuant to Long. 89 However, neither opinion
specifically required judges or juries to examine stress in assessing eyewitness
evidence, and neither mentioned weapon focus at all.
In addition to the inadequacy of Long and Ramirez on their own terms, the
Utah Supreme Court has more recently undercut the efficacy of those decisions
with its opinion in State v. Guzman.2" In Guzman, the court acknowledged that it
had excluded certainty from the factors it had required in jury instructions and for
judicial consideration of due process claims in Long and Ramirez respectively, but
the court went on to hold that it would not violate state due process rights for
judges to examine certainty in assessing the admissibility of eyewitness evidence or
for juries to use an eyewitness's testimony about his certainty to gauge the overall
reliability of the identification.29 1 In so holding, the court emphasized that it had
previously stated the list of factors it had promulgated was not exhaustive.292 It is
difficult to credit this reasoning as anything other than disingenuous; the entire
point of the court's previous exclusion of certainty from the list of reliability factors
was its acknowledgment of the questionable correlation between certainty and
accuracy. 293 The Guzman court attempted to justify its ruling by noting recent
2"5 Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 784.
2
'6 Long, 721 P.2d at 489, 493.
2
'7 Id. at 494 n.8, 495.
281 Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 783.
289 State v. Clopten, 223 P.3d 1103, 1110 (Utah 2009).
' State v. Guzman, 133 P.3d 363, 366-67 (Utah 2006).
291 See id. at 368.
292 d.293 See State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483, 490-93 (Utah 1986).
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research that had shown, in the court's estimation, "a direct link between witness
certainty and the accuracy of the identification."294 However, the research the court
cited noted only a moderately positive correlation between certainty and accuracy
even under ideal conditions, and cautioned that, in the real world, with "less than
pristine conditions, witness confidence is highly malleable and may be 'pushed
around' in ways that weaken or destroy even the modest confidence-accuracy
relation."295 This caveat is particularly salient in light of the Utah Supreme Court's
failure to delineate the administrative measures necessary to eliminate from
identification procedures the kind of suggestion that makes certainty irrelevant to
reliability, and given uncontradicted research showing that confidence remains "by
far the most important consideration to jurors" evaluating eyewitness evidence.296
Promisingly, however, the court did rule in 2009 in State v. Clopten that there
should be "liberal and routine admission of eyewitness expert testimony,
particularly in cases where . . . eyewitnesses are identifying a defendant not well
known to them."297 In so ruling, the court reversed its previous presumption that
expert testimony on eyewitness identification would be inadmissible,29 dismissed
any notion that jurors already understand the limitations of eyewitness evidence, 9
and emphasized that jury instructions and cross-examination alone are likely to be
insufficient to assist jurors in spotting mistaken identifications."s ° The court also
specifically stated that among the factors experts might explain to jurors are "the
weak correlation between confidence and accuracy,"301 the consequences of stress
and weapon focus, 302 and "potentially suggestive police conduct."30 3 Again,
however, research demonstrates that expert testimony has only a limited effect on
jurors' understanding of the reliability of identification evidence, and, in particular,
does not enhance jurors' appreciation of the factors that make an identification
procedure more or less suggestive. This research shows that such testimony is an
imperfect substitute for effective judicial gatekeeping; yet, as I have discussed, the
Utah Supreme Court has also failed to provide judges with comprehensive
guidance on the kinds of suggestive techniques that reduce reliability.
" Guzman, 133 P.3d at 368 (citing Wells et al., Eyewitness Identification Procedures, supra note 68,
at 622).
295 Wells et al., Eyewitness Identification Procedures, supra note 68, at 623.
2 9 6 Id. at 624.
297 State v. Clopten, 223 P.3d 1103, 1112 (Utah 2009).
2 9 8 Id.
I9 Id. at 1106.
300Id. at 1110-11.
301 Id. at 1109.
302 See id.
303 See id. at 1113 n.22.
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D. North Carolina/Ohio
Like Wisconsin and a number of other jurisdictions, North Carolina and Ohio
have enacted statutory provisions that require law enforcement agencies to
implement policies to reduce eyewitness misidentification. However, unlike other
states, the North Carolina and Ohio statutes include consequences for
noncompliance. 30 4  Specifically, both statutes require judges to consider
noncompliance when adjudicating suppression motions,3 0 5 and both require judges
to instruct juries that they may consider noncompliance in evaluating the reliability
of eyewitness evidence. 30 6 These definite repercussions for recalcitrance should
provide a significant incentive for law enforcement agencies to ensure their
personnel follow the detailed statutory guidance on how to conduct identification
procedures. Additionally, although North Carolina and Ohio have each retained
the Manson test for evaluating due process claims under their own constitutions, 30 7
one might nonetheless expect, given these statutory directives, that courts in North
Carolina and Ohio would regularly avoid one of the common errors of judges
applying Manson-failure to recognize flawed identification procedures as
unnecessarily suggestive. However, the results have been mixed, even on this score.
First, the text of the eyewitness statute in North Carolina mandates that the
administrators of identification procedures either be unaware of the identity of the
suspect or, at least, that administrators use procedures to prevent themselves from
knowing the placement of the suspect in an identification procedure and, thus,
which participant the witness is viewing at any given time.30 8 Ohio's law includes a
similar requirement, but it allows for procedures in which the administrator knows
both the identity and position of the suspect if using a blind procedure is
impracticable.3° In such cases, Ohio requires the administrator to provide a written
explanation of the impracticability.3 0 Among other safeguards, each statute also
compels administrators to issue warnings to witnesses that suspects might not be
'3' See Garrett, supra note 135, at 491-92.
mo See N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 15A-284.52(d)(1) (West, Westlaw through Ch. 266, excluding
240-41,246, 258-64, of the 2015 Reg. Sess. of the Gen. Assemb.); see also OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
2933.83(C)(1) (West, Westlaw through 2015 Files 1 to 10, and 12 to 24 of the 131st Gen. Assemb.
(2015-16)).
3 § 15A-284.52(d)(3) (Wesdaw); § 2933.83(C)(3) (Westlaw).
307 See State v. Rogers, 562 S.E.2d 859, 868 (N.C. 2002); State v. Bates, 850 N.E.2d 1208, 1209
(Ohio 2006).
3 § 15A-284.52(b)(1), (c) (Westlaw).
3' § 2933.83(B)(1) (Westlaw).
310 § 2933.83(B)(3) (Westlaw).
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present,311 to take immediate confidence statements from witnesses at the time of
their identifications,312 and to record the results of identification procedures. 
313
The rules both states have provided in their eyewitness statutes have
undoubtedly led to some improvement of the administration of identification
procedures. Recent cases in which defendants challenged eyewitness evidence in
North Carolina, for example, show that police personnel in those cases had often
complied with many of the statutory requirements. In State v. Wilson, a case in
which the defendant claimed a photo array was suggestive because officers failed to
ensure his picture resembled his appearance at the time of the offense, failed to
ensure fillers resembled the witness's description of the perpetrator, and used a
photo of him that was smaller than others in the array,314 the state's appellate brief
makes dear that police had followed most of the eyewitness statute's rules,
including blind administration of the procedure and provision of instructions to the
witness about possible perpetrator absence. 315 Likewise, in State v. Jenkins, though
the defendant objected that the detective who administered a photo array knew the
defendant's picture was present in the array, the detective had prevented himself
from knowing the location of the defendant's photo by using an array of shuffled
envelopes to present the photos to the witness, in compliance with the statute.316 In
State v. Slaughter, the witness testified that the administrator of a photo array had
warned him the perpetrator might not be present and stated he felt no compulsion
to make an identification.
317
Nonetheless, judicial reliance on the statutes has been insufficient to mitigate
the deficiencies of Manson. First, the statutes address only system variables and do
nothing to inform judges of the large number of estimator variables that affect
reliability. Second, because the statutes require only that judges consider violations
in assessing suppression motions, rather than requiring suppression, judges have
tended to adhere to the general judicial proclivity to admit tainted eyewitness
evidence, even while acknowledging flawed identification procedures. Third, the
statutorily required jury instructions judges in North Carolina and Ohio have
issued as alternatives to suppression have been too general to inform jurors
effectively of the problems with identification evidence they must evaluate. As
noted above, moreover, even if these jurisdictions revise their instructions to
include greater detail, instructions remain an inadequate substitute for suppression.
311 § 15A-284.52(b)(3)(a) (Westlaw); Ohio's statute requires such warnings in cases involving a
blind administrator, but the state does not seem to require the instruction when blind administration is
impracticable. § 2933.83(B)(5) (Westlaw).
312 § 15A-284.52(b)(12) (Westlaw); § 2933.83(B)(4)(a) (Westlaw).
313 § 15A-284.52(b)(14) (Westlaw); § 2933.83(B)(4) (Westlaw).
314 State v. Wilson, 737 S.E2d 186, 188 (N.C. Ct. App. 2013).
s Brief for the State at 6, State v. Wilson, 737 S.E.2d 186 (N.C. Ct. App. 2013) (No. COA12-
954).
316 State v. Jenkins, No. COA12-1085, 2013 WL 1314191, at *3 (N.C. Ct. App. Apr. 2, 2013).
311 State v. Slaughter, No. COA12-631, 2012 WL 6591496, at *4 (N.C. Ct. App. Dec. 18, 2012).
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Finally, until December of 2015, when a revision to North Carolina's law became
effective, both statutes applied only to live lineups and photo arrays, leaving the
most suggestive identification procedures, showups and photo showups,
ungoverned by any legislative wisdom that might constrain judicial decision-
making.
Because the statutes in both states are designed to address only system variables,
judges in North Carolina and Ohio are likely to ignore the array of estimator
variables that judges in other jurisdictions routinely overlook when analyzing
evidence under Manson. Furthermore, even with regard to system variables, a major
shortcoming of both eyewitness statutes is the weak mandate of each law that
judges merely consider violations in adjudicating suppression motions. In practice,
judges assessing violations of the statutes have tended not only to admit the
challenged evidence, but also to find that violations did not even amount to the
impermissible suggestion necessary to satisfy the first prong of the Manson analysis.
In North Carolina, in State v. Howie, the defendant challenged a photo array at
which two officers who knew his identity as a suspect were present, and one of
those officers responded to the witness's look of frustration after examining several
photos by saying, "[A]ll we need you to do is just pick the person out who you saw
crossing the parking lot."318 In assessing the due process claim, the intermediate
appellate court emphasized that violation of the eyewitness statute does not require
a finding of impermissible suggestion, but, rather, only consideration of the
violation. 31 9 The court then concluded the procedure was not impermissibly
suggestive, despite the violation, because although officers who knew the suspect's
identity were present, a blind administrator actually conducted the procedure, and
the other officers could not see which photo the witness was viewing at any given
moment. 320 Additionally, the witness claimed not to have heard the comment
stating that the officers needed him to pick out the perpetrator.3 21 Similarly, in
State v. Stowes, the intermediate appellate court accepted the trial court's holding
that the presence of an officer involved in the investigation violated North
Carolina's eyewitness statute,322 but the court also held the violation did not render
the procedure impermissibly suggestive because a blind administrator actually
conducted the array, and there was no evidence the officer involved in the
investigation had done anything to suggest the identity of the suspect to the
witness.323 Of course, a primary reason for blind administration is that officers
involved in a case might signal their knowledge to witnesses unintentionally, and
such signaling might often be subtle enough that neither the officer nor the witness
318 State v. Howie, No. COA13-553,2014 WL 1047373, at *5-6 (N.C. Ct. App. Mar. 18, 2014).
3 9 
Id. at *9.
'20 Id. at *11.
321 Id.
322 See State v. Stowes, 727 S.E.2d 351,356-58 (N.C. Ct. App. 2012).
323 Id. at 357.
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would be likely to be consciously aware of it. Thus, the Sto'wes court missed an
opportunity to condemn this sort of procedure as presumptively suggestive,
whether or not any specific evidence of comments or gestures by the investigating
officer is available in the record.
Courts in Ohio have also stressed that violation of the state's eyewitness statute
does not require suppression and should not necessarily result in a finding of
unnecessary suggestion. 324 In State v. Simpson, the Ohio Court of Appeals, Ohio's
intermediate appellate court, found photo arrays not impermissibly suggestive,
32z
despite violation of the state's eyewitness law through failure to use blind
administration without any written explanation of why using a blind procedure
would have been impracticable. 326 The court supported its ruling by stating that it
would "defer to the trial court's assessment of credibility and conclusion that the
officers did not in any way suggest Simpson's identity to any of the witnesses."
327
As a consequence of its determination that the non-blind procedures were not
impermissibly suggestive, the court declined even to consider the overall reliability
of the identification evidence.
32 8
Yet just as there is unlikely to be evidence available of subtle, unintentional
suggestion, the credibility of the administrator and of the eyewitness are beside the
point when dealing with the possibility of subconscious signaling. These cases from
North Carolina and Ohio reveal the serious shortcomings of the states' eyewitness
statutes. Although the laws instruct courts to consider violations in adjudicating
suppression motions, courts in both states that have dealt with actual violations
have simply been incapable of comprehending the practical implications of the
flawed procedures they have examined.
In addition to the ways in which statutory violation might inform a court's due
process analysis, North Carolina has an alternative statutory basis for exclusion.
According to a provision broadly targeting illegally obtained evidence, exclusion is
required as a consequence of any "substantial violation" of a statutory section
dealing with procurement of evidence, including the eyewitness law.329 For
egregious violations of the eyewitness statute, this could provide a basis for
exclusion filly independent of due process analysis. Thus far, however, courts
assessing requests for suppression have found violations of the eyewitness law not
324 See, e.g., State v. Shaw, 4 N.E.3d 406, 419-20 (Ohio Ct. App. 2013); State v. Simpson, No.
25069,2013 WL 1189227, at *14-15 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 22,2013).
32 Simpson, 2013 WL 1189227, at *15.
326 Id. at *6.327 Id. at *15.
328 See id. at *15.
329 See N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 15A-974(a)(2) (West, Westlaw through Ch. 175 of the 2015 Reg.
Sess. of the Gen. Assemb.).
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to be substantial, just as they have generally found such violations not to be
impermissibly suggestive.33
The retention of the Manson test in both jurisdictions also means that even if
courts do find identification procedures unnecessarily suggestive, they are likely to
use flawed and incomplete analysis to conclude the evidence is nonetheless reliable
and admissible. In some cases, North Carolina courts have, like federal courts,
applied the Manson factors in ways that undermine even their limited potential for
ascertaining the reliability of identification evidence. In State v. Slaughter, for
example, the North Carolina Court of Appeals found identification evidence
reliable despite initial identification from a showup-like viewing of surveillance
footage, relying in part on the witness's statement at trial that he was "100 percent
sure" of his identification. 331 Likewise, Ohio courts have recently gauged reliability
in response to challenges to allegedly flawed pre-trial identification procedures by
measuring witnesses' certainty at trial. 332 Thus, the requirement in each state's
statute that lineup administrators take contemporaneous confidence statements
does not seem to have led judges to stop measuring confidence after witnesses have
been exposed to suggestion, when that very suggestion is likely to have artificially
inflated their certainty. Furthermore, the retention of Manson, coupled with the
failure of either statute to address estimator variables, means that courts in both
states are unlikely consistently to consider the large number of variables beyond the
Manson factors that impact reliability.
The alternative sanction to suppression under each of the statutes, issuance of a
jury instruction, is also inadequate, particularly because of the generalized
instructions on which both jurisdictions have continued to rely. Although each
statute directs judges to instruct jurors that they may consider noncompliance in
determining the reliability of eyewitness evidence, neither compels a detailed
explanation of the ways in which various factors affect reliability. 33 3 Thus, jurors are
" As of the summer of 2014, only two cases since passage of the eyewitness statute available on
Westlaw and containing the word "eyewitness" had cited the general provision on suppression for
substantial violations. See State v. Howie, No. COA13-553, 2014 WL 1047373, at *9-10 (N.C. Ct.
App. Mar. 18, 2014) (finding presence at identification procedure of officers who knew suspect's
identity and comment by one officer urging witness to pick out the perpetrator not to be substantial
violations); State v. Stowes, 727 S.E.2d 351, 357-58 (N.C. Ct. App. 2012) (noting that provision on
suppression for substantial violations requires timely motion, which defendant had not made, and
finding presence of non-blind officer at identification procedure not impermissibly suggestive).
331 State v. Slaughter, No. COA12-631, 2012 WL 6591496, at *3 (N.C. Ct. App. Dec. 18, 2012).
332 See, e.g., State v. Howard, No. 100094, 2014 WL 2167980, at *6 (Ohio Ct. App. May 22, 2014);
State v. Griffith, No. 2008-P-0089, 2010 WL 759192, at *1, *8 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 5, 2010) (relying,
in the wake of a showup identification, on witness's statement on the witness stand that he was "pretty
positive" of his identification to find evidence reliable).
3' Both statutes mandate only an instruction that jurors "may consider credible evidence" of
noncompliance in assessing reliability. § 15A-284.52(d)(3) (Westlaw); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
2933.83(C)(3) (West, Westlaw through 2015 Fides 1 to 10, and 12 to 24 of the 131st Gen. Assemb.
2014-15).
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left to their frequently incorrect, commonsense impressions of identification
evidence.
A recent Ohio opinion reveals this problem. In Simpson, the Ohio Court of
Appeals approved of the trial court's failure to provide detailed guidance to jurors
and of the generalized instruction to the jury that it could consider non-blind
administration in assessing the identification evidence. 334 Though the court noted
that the defendant had failed to request an alternative instruction at trial, it also
emphasized that the judge's instruction complied with the requirements of the
state's eyewitness statute. 335 In a concurrence, Judge Froelich stressed the deficiency
of this generalized instruction and asserted that "the mere incantation that the jury
may consider noncompliance is illusory, without additional information as to why
that noncompliance is relevant, such an instruction has questionable force."
336
Judge Froelich also observed that the trial judge had undercut any minimal benefit
the basic instruction on statutory violation might have provided by further
instructing the jury that the identification procedures were in compliance with the
state and federal constitutions. 37 Nonetheless, Judge Froelich concurred in the
judgment because, unquestionably, the trial court had "complied with the law."338
North Carolina's statutorily required jury instruction includes no more detail than
Ohio's, and North Carolina courts have also issued minimalist instructions in
response to claimed statutory violations.3
39
Beyond the issue of statutory violation, courts in Ohio have tended to issue
pattern instructions that provide little more than a reminder of the burden of proof
and a recitation of Manson's reliability factors, 340 and North Carolina courts have
tended to rely on highly generalized pattern instructions advising juries to use their
common experience to assess the credibility and believability of all witnesses. 341 In
the face of defendants' requests for more detailed guidance to juries, the North
Carolina Supreme Court has affirmed the sufficiency of the minimalist pattern
instruction. 342 Most recently, North Carolina's intermediate appellate court
"34 See State v. Simpson, No. 25069, 2013 WL 1189227, at "11, *15 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 22,
2013).
131 Id. at "15.
336 Id. at *20 (Froelich, J., concurring).
337 See id. at *20-21.338 Id. at *21.
339 See, e.g., State v. Wilson, 737 S.E.2d 186, 188 (N.C. Ct. App. 2013) (noting only that, in
response to a claimed violation of § 15A-284.52, the trial court had instructed the jury that it "may
consider what evidence [it] find[s] to be credible concerning compliance or non-compliance with such
requirements in determining the reliability of eyewitness identification" (alterations in original)).
" See, e.g., Simpson, 2013 WL 1189227, at "15 (stating that the trial court's instruction, which
mentioned the Manson factors, was consistent with Ohio's pattern eyewitness instruction) (citing Ohio
Jury Instructions, CR 409.05 (Rev. Aug. 15, 2012)).
" See, e.g., State v. Watlington, 759 S.E.2d 116, 128-30 (N.C. Ct. App. 2014).
342 See State v. Dodd, 412 S.E.2d 46, 49 (N.C. 1992); State v. Green, 290 S.E.2d 625, 633 (N.C.
1982).
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reiterated that the state's supreme court had held the pattern instructions to be
adequate and declined to rule on whether a defendant's case was distinguishable
from the earlier cases, in which defendants had requested detailed instructions on
witnesses' opportunities to view the perpetrator, based on the subtle and
counterintuitive factors of which the defendant in the case at hand hoped to inform
the jury.34 3 The North Carolina court acknowledged the New Jersey Supreme
Court's requirement of detailed guidance for juries in Henderson, but declined to
adopt that court's reasoning, in part because there was no evidence in the record to
support the validity of the variables the Henderson court endorsed. 3"
Additionally, although the Ohio Supreme Court favors the admission of expert
testimony, at least in the limited class of cases in which an eyewitness's
identification is the only evidence that connects the defendant to the offense, 345
North Carolina continues to use a purely discretionary standard for the admission
of expert testimony on the issue. 341 Ultimately, neither state consistently ensures
that jurors will have enough information to evaluate effectively the reliability of
eyewitness identification evidence. And, as I have discussed above, even regular
admission of experts and detailed jury instructions are imperfect substitutes for
effective judicial gate-keeping through exclusion of tainted evidence.
Finally, whatever paltry influence the eyewitness statutes in North Carolina and
Ohio have had on courts in those states has been limited further because, until
recently, the language of both statutes referred only to lineups and photo arrays, 34 7
and courts in both states interpreted the laws as having no bearing on the
administration of showups or of photo showups. 341 Ohio has enacted another
statute requesting that its attorney general adopt rules for identification procedures,
including showups, consistent with the statutory requirements for lineups and
photo arrays, 349 but the state has no statutory requirement regarding the
administration of showups or the ways courts should evaluate the admissibility of
evidence derived from showups. Promisingly, North Carolina recently amended its
41 Watlington, 759 S.E.2d at 128-30.
'44 Id. at 129-30.
145 See State v. Buell, 489 N.E.2d 795,801-02, 804 (Ohio 1986).
6 Vallas, supra note 2, at 143.
341 See N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 15A-284.52 (West, Westlaw through Ch. 266, excluding 240-41,
246, 258-64, of the 2015 Reg. Sess. of the Gen. Assemb.); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2933.83 (West,
Westlaw through 2015 Files 1 to 10, and 12 to 24 of the 131st Gen. Assemb. 2014-15).
348 See, e.g., State v. Bailey, No. COA12-558, 2012 WL 5864526, at *3-4 (N.C. Ct. App. Nov. 20,
2012) (holding that the state's eyewitness statute does not apply to photo showups, and assuming
arguendo that the procedure was unnecessarily suggestive, finding the evidence reliable); State v. Rawls,
700 S.E.2d 112, 115-18 (N.C. Ct. App. 2010) (ruling that the eyewitness statute is inapplicable to
showups); State v. Miller, No. 2011-L-111, 2012 WL 3156497, at *6-7 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 6, 2012)
(stating that Ohio's eyewitness law 'governs photograph and live lineup procedures but not single
photograph identification," but finding that evidence should have been suppressed using traditional due
process analysis).
349 OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2933.831 (West 2010, Westlaw through 2015 Files 1 to 10, and 12
to 24 of the 131st Gen. Assemb. 2015-16).
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statute to include rules for conducting live showups and prohibiting the use of
photo showups.350 Before this amendment, the statutory requirements, including
that police provide witnesses with adequate warnings and take immediate certainty
statements, had no effect on judicial analysis in either state when police resorted to
the most suggestive techniques possible, and no effect on police conduct at all in
North Carolina.
Overall, North Carolina and Ohio's eyewitness statutes have very likely led to
statewide improvement of the way law enforcement officers in those jurisdictions
conduct many identification procedures. It is dear, however, that these statutes
have not led judges in those states to incorporate fully the last several decades of
scientific research into their decision-making. By retaining the Manson standard in
its entirety, courts in both states have also failed to take any serious independent
initiative to improve standards for assessing eyewitness evidence.
E. Miscellaneous Incremental Reforms
Other states have taken less sweeping measures, some of which I have
mentioned briefly above, to improve the administration of identification procedures
and their assessment by judges and juries. As I have discussed, several states have
enacted eyewitness statutes that require law enforcement agencies to use reliable
methods for conducting identification procedures. However, as is the case with
Wisconsin's eyewitness statute, most of these laws have failed to provide even the
weak sanctions for noncompliance that North Carolina and Ohio included in their
laws.351 Also, as I have discussed in the cases of New York, Massachusetts, and
Ohio, some jurisdictions favor admission of expert testimony, at least in limited
circumstances. 352 Beyond these rules, a few states have made piecemeal efforts to
improve their eyewitness law in a variety of ways. In 2012, the Supreme Court of
Hawaii required enhanced jury instructions based on model instructions from
California and included reference to several estimator variables that reduce
reliability.353 The approved instruction, however, excludes any discussion of system
variables and continues to instruct jurors to consider the eyewitness's certainty.35 4
In 2005, the Georgia Supreme Court instructed trial courts to discontinue
instructing jurors to consider certainty when they examine the reliability of
3"0 § 15A-28452 (Westlaw).
351 See, e.g., W. VA. CODE ANN. §62-1E-2 (West, Westlaw through the 2015 Reg. Sess.)
(requiring, inter alia, blind administration, warnings, and recording of witness certainty at the time of an
identification, but including no provision for sanction in the event of noncompliance); People v. Faber,
974 N.E.2d 337, 348-49 (Ill. App. Ct. 2012) (finding that violation of Illinois statute regulating
administration of photo arrays did not require suppression, given that statutory language did not require
suppression as a remedy for noncompliance); Garrett, supra note 135, at 491-92.
352 See Vallas, supra note 2, at 119-24 (surveying the jurisdictions that take this approach).
3 See State v. Cabagbag, 277 P.3d 1027, 1038-39 (Haw. 2012).354 Id. at 1039.
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eyewitness evidence. 35 5 However, Georgia continues to use the Manson test,
including the certainty factor, to assess the admissibility of evidence when
defendants make due process claims. 356 Crucially, at the time of these decisions,
neither Georgia nor Hawaii had statewide reform policies for the administration of
identification procedures that could enhance the diagnostic value of a witness's
certainty. 3 7 Connecticut's Supreme Court has required the issuance of a corrective
jury instruction in cases in which police fail to warn eyewitnesses the perpetrator
might be absent from an identification procedure.358 Finally, several states,
including some I have discussed in this article, have acknowledged that, in rare
circumstances, courts might use state equivalents of Federal Rule of Evidence 403
to exclude unreliable and prejudicial eyewitness evidence in cases not involving
suggestive police conduct, while nonetheless failing to offer detailed guidance on
the factors judges should consider in making such determinations.35 9 These reforms
represent the admirable sentiment that something should be done to reduce
eyewitness misidentification, yet each is also even more meager than those I have
discussed above.
F. New Jersey/Oregon
In 2011, the New Jersey Supreme Court issued its decision in State v.
Henderson, using the court's supervisory powers to direct police to use some best
practices for conducting identification procedures and discussing a wide range of
estimator and system variables courts should consider in adjudicating suppression
motions and that should be included in detailed jury instructions. Specifically, the
court invoked its supervisory powers to require police to record immediate
confidence statements, 360 to avoid confirmatory feedback,361 and to record
witnesses' answers to questions about the content of any communications witnesses
have had with anyone else about the identification.3 62 While not explicitly invoking
... Brodes v. State, 614 S.E.2d 766, 771 (Ga. 2005).
356 See Wright v. State, 756 S.E.2d 513,517-18 (Ga. 2014).
'57 See GA. CODE ANN. § 17-20-2 (West, Wesdaw through 2015 Reg. Legis. Sess.); How is Your
State Doing?: Hawaii, INNOCENCE PROJECT http://www.innocenceproject.org/how-is-your-state-
doing/HL (last visited Jan. 20, 2016) (stating that Hawaii "has no statewide eyewitness identification
reform policy"). Fortunately, Georgia recently passed legislation requiring compliance with best
practices, including blind administration, instructions regarding potential perpetrator absence, and
recording eyewitness confidence at the time of an initial identification. That legislation will take effect
in July of 2016. § 17-20-2 (Westlaw).
358 See State v. Ledbetter, 881 A.2d 290,316-19 (Conn. 2005).
... See, e.g., People v. Marte, 912 N.E.2d 37, 41 (N.Y. 2009) (speculating that "[p]erhaps other
safeguards would be appropriate in particular cases, and we do not rule out the possibility that a court, in
balancing probative value against prejudicial effect, may find some testimony so unreliable that it is
inadmissible").
" State v. Henderson, 27 A.3d 872, 900 (N.J. 2011).
361 Id.
32 Id. at 909.
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its supervisory powers, the court also found that non-blind administration can
increase the odds of misidentfication, 3 63 and it stated that police should issue
warnings about possible perpetrator absence, 364 should construct lineups so that
suspects do not stand out,365 should use at least five fillers in lineups, 3M should
include no more than one suspect, 367 and should avoid presenting suspects to
witnesses on more than one occasion. 361 In addition to these system variables, the
court determined that judges and juries charged with evaluating eyewitness
evidence should consider a long list of estimator variables, induding stress, weapon
focus, race bias, and any suggestion from private actors. 369 While using Oregon's
version of Federal Rule of Evidence 403 instead of due process, the Oregon
Supreme Court responded to Henderson the following year by incorporating similar
variables into the required analysis for judges considering the admissibility of
eyewitness evidence;370 like the Henderson court, Oregon also approved the use of
detailed jury instructions in cases in which judges ultimately admit questionable
eyewitness evidence. 37' Then, in 2013, the Supreme Court of Idaho followed suit,
citing the decisions in Oregon and New Jersey and listing the system and estimator
variables those courts had discussed to provide guidance to Idaho judges examining
due process claims.
372
The Henderson court held that defendants are entitled to a pre-trial hearing on
the admissibility of identification evidence when they show some evidence of
suggestion tied to a system variable.373 Once a defendant has met this initial
burden, the state has the burden of producing evidence that the identification was
reliable, accounting for both system and estimator variables. 374 The defendant has
363 Id. at 897.364 id.
365 Id. at 897-98.
36 Id. at 898.
367 id.
361 Id. at 900-01.
369 Id. at 904-10.
31 See State v. Lawson, 291 P.3d 673, 686-95 (Or. 2012).
371 See id. at 697.
31 State v. Almaraz, 301 P.3d 242,251-53 (Idaho 2013).
373 See Henderson, 27 A.3d at 920. By requiring only evidence of suggestion, as opposed to
unnecessary or "impermissible" suggestion, the Henderson court eliminated a significant hurdle to
exclusion of unreliable evidence. See id. at 918 (describing the requirement of a finding of"impermissible
suggestiveness" as a flaw in the Manson test). In contrast to the federal standard, any use of a showup
should, for example, lead to the possibility of exclusion. All showups are suggestive, even if, as the
United States Supreme Court has asserted, they might sometimes be necessary. See Stovall v. Denno,
388 U.S. 293, 302 (1967). Likewise, the Oregon Supreme Court did not condition the possibility of
exclusion under Rule 403 on a finding that suggestive identification procedures were unnecessarily or
impermissibly suggestive. See Lawson, 291 P.3d at 688-89. On the other hand, the Idaho Supreme
Court, while endorsing consideration of the system and estimator variables the Henderson court
identified, has retained the threshold requirement of a finding of"impermissibly suggestive" procedures.
Almaraz, 301 P.3d at 253.
3' Henderson, 27 A.3d. at 920.
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the ultimate burden to persuade the court of a "very substantial likelihood of
irreparable misidentification."3
75
In an opinion issued the same day as Henderson, the New Jersey Supreme Court
specified that, in limited circumstances, defendants would be entitled to pre-trial
hearings on the admissibility of identification evidence even without suggestiveness
related to system variables.376 In the absence of state action, the court held, the
defendant would be required to present evidence that an identification was made
under "highly suggestive," rather than merely suggestive, circumstances. 377 The
Oregon Supreme Court also contemplated exclusion of unreliable eyewitness
evidence without state action, holding that it would be possible to use Rule 403 to
exclude eyewitness evidence when only estimator variables made the identification
problematic.37 s However, despite accepting the theoretical possibility, the court
stated that it was doubtful that issues relating to estimator variables alone would be
sufficient to support suppression. 379
Henderson and the decisions it has inspired have justifiably received significant
praise. As has been well documented, courts applying Manson without additional
guidance have routinely made findings inconsistent with the overwhelming weight
of scientific evidence. By incorporating that science into the factors judges and, in
New Jersey and Oregon, juries must consider, courts in these states have made truly
significant improvements on the federal standard for assessing eyewitness evidence.
There is, accordingly, real merit in the notion others have expressed that Henderson
should serve as a model for other states.
Nonetheless, the experience of other jurisdictions that have made attempts to
improve their eyewitness law should qualify, to some extent, the enthusiasm with
375 id.
376 See State v. Chen, 27 A.3d 930, 942-43 (NJ. 2011).
377 Id. at 943.
371 See Lawson, 291 P.3d at 697. The allowance for the possibility of suppression of unreliable
evidence without state action in New Jersey may not include cases in which only problems with
estimator variables that reduce reliability without suggesting the identity of the suspect (e.g., poor
lighting, cross-racial identification, stress, weapon focus, passage of time) are at issue, given the Chen
court's focus on "suggestiveness." See Cben, 27 A.3d at 942-43. On the other hand, the Henderson court
did assert that, in rare cases, judges could use Rule 403 to "redact parts of identification testimony."
Henderson, 27 A.3d at 925. Although it did not examine the issue explicitly, perhaps the New Jersey
Supreme Court would be willing to contemplate the possibility of exclusion of eyewitness testimony
under Rule 403 in cases involving only estimator variables bearing on general reliability, without factors
easily classifiable as suggestive. In rejecting a defendant's proposed rule limiting due process analysis to
state or private suggestion, the United States Supreme Court noted that if the Court accepted that due
process could be implicated without state action, there would be no reason to distinguish cases involving
suggestion from cases in which eyewitness evidence was arguably unreliable for other reasons. See Perry
v. New Hampshire, 132 S. Ct. 716, 727 (2012) ("There is no reason why an identification made by an
eyewitness with poor vision, for example, or one who harbors a grudge against the defendant, should be
regarded as inherently more reliable, less of a 'threat to the fairness of trial,' than the identification
Blandon made in this case." (citation omitted)). Given the New Jersey Supreme Court's abandonment
of a state-action requirement in Cben, it might find the Perry Court's logic compelling in a future case.
37' Lawson, 291 P.3d at 697.
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which scholars and lawyers have received Henderson. In those other jurisdictions,
judicial pronouncements on the dangers of misidentification and seemingly
wholehearted endorsements of scientific research have frequently been followed by
failures to follow up on piecemeal reforms and, in some cases, by retreat from even
the modest measures earlier opinions had adopted. Henderson is certainly a more
sweeping reform than anything that preceded it. However, even that decision leaves
significant room for judges to evade their responsibility to protect against the
dangers of wrongful conviction.
It is still too early to predict with any certainty how lower courts will apply
Henderson.3"' Yet language from Henderson itself exposes the potential ways future
judges might avoid using scientific evidence to provide defendants with the full
measure of protection against misidentification. In fact, the Henderson court
concluded by asserting that suppression of eyewitness evidence should remain rare,
and that, in most cases, cross-examination and jury instructions will be the only
safeguards available to defendants who challenge tainted eyewitness evidence.381
The Oregon Supreme Court qualified its ruling with a similar pronouncement.38 2
As I have discussed, however, there is good reason to believe that even the best jury
instructions will be incapable of frilly dispelling the commonsense myths laypeople
hold about the quality of identification evidence.
On remand, New Jersey's intermediate appellate court noted at least one way in
which Henderson actually may provide less protection than New Jersey's
interpretation of the requirements of the Manson standard. 383 Although the United
States Supreme Court has never decided who bears the burden of persuasion on
whether a suggestive procedure rendered identification evidence unreliable,384 the
New Jersey Supreme Court had previously required the prosecution to prove by
dear and convincing evidence that identification evidence was "independent" of
suggestive procedures. 385 Of course, a defendant in New Jersey could always rely
3' Although more than one hundred New Jersey opinions available on Westlaw had cited
Henderson by late July 2014, the most recent opinions available at that time continued to use the
previous law to evaluate challenged evidence. See, e.g., State v. Carter, No. 10-01-0004, 2014 WL
3407897, at *9 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. July 15, 2014). This is attributable to the Henderson court's
determination that its ruling would apply only prospectively, except for the cases of Henderson and
Chen. Henderson, 27 A.3d at 928.
381 See Henderson, 27 A.3d at 928.
32 Lawson, 291 P.3d at 697 ("Wie anticipate that the trial courts will continue to admit most
eyewitness identifications.").
383 See State v. Henderson, 77 A.3d 536, 542 n.9 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2013) [hereinafter
Henderson 11].
31 In her dissent in Perry, Justice Sotomayor did state that the defendant bears the initial burden of
demonstrating impermissible suggestion, but she did not address who bears the ultimate burden
regarding reliability. Perry v. New Hampshire, 132 S. Ct. 716, 733 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
" Henderson II, 77 A.3d at 542 (citing State v. Madison, 536 A.2d 254, 265 (NJ. 1988)) (noting
that the Henderson court stated the burden "remains" with the defendant, suggesting the court might not
have believed it was altering the previous law on this issue).
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alternatively on the federal due process standard, but review of the evidence would
then presumably be subject only to Manson's reliability test.
In 2014, New Jersey's intermediate appellate court also rejected the notion that
Henderson's principles prevent the government from forgoing pre-trial
identification procedures altogether and allowed a witness to identify the defendant
for the first time in court while the defendant sat with his counsel at the defense
table.386 The court in that case did at least suggest that judges must grant
affirmative requests from defendants for a pre-trial lineup.38 7 Similarly, despite
acknowledging the similarities between such in-court identifications and
showups, 388 the Oregon Supreme Court ruled in 2014 that first-time in-court
identifications might continue to be permissible.38 9
Perhaps the most telling sign that unreserved jubilation remains unwarranted,
even in New Jersey, comes from the subsequent history of Henderson itself. In
describing the determinations the trial judge made on remand, the intermediate
appellate court noted the judge had found the two-week delay between crime and
identification in the case to be a "relatively short span."39 ° Yet, despite the supreme
court's citation in its landmark decision of a study noting significant increases in
misidentification within two to twenty-four hours after an event,391 the
intermediate appellate court held the trial judge's finding to be adequately
supported by the evidence. 392 In June of 2014, the New Jersey Supreme Court
declined further review.3 93
CONCLUSION
In considering the best approaches to eyewitness law, it is worth highlighting
the distinction between directives that govern the way police collect eyewitness
evidence and those guiding courts in evaluating its admissibility. Every state should
implement clear rules requiring police to comply with best practices for the
collection of eyewitness evidence. Doing so would reduce the rate of
misidentification without diminishing the ability of eyewitnesses to make accurate
identifications of perpetrators when they are present or significantly taxing law
enforcement resources. 394 The precise manner in which courts should analyze
eyewitness evidence, however, is less certain.
6 See State v. Bridges, Nos. 05-11-2686 & 05-11-2687, 2014 WL 2957443, at *8 (NJ. Super. Ct.
App. Div. July 2,2014).
317 See id. at *9.
31 State v. Hickman, 330 P.3d 551, 567 (Or. 2014).
381 See id. at 568-71.
3 1 Henderson H1, 77 A.3d at 546.
391 State v. Henderson, 27 A.3d 872, 907 (NJ. 2011) (citation omitted).
392 Henderson -U, 77 A.3d at 546.
393 State v. Henderson, 91 A.3d 25 (NJ. 2014) (unpublished table decision denying disposition).
394 See Wells et al., Eyewitness Identification Procedures, supra note 68, at 627-37.
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In the past, I have argued that it is of paramount importance that courts
incorporate eyewitness science into their evaluation of identification evidence and
that once that has been accomplished, it is unclear whether a per se exclusionary
nle in the wake of suggestive procedures or a totality-of-the-circumstances
reliability test strikes the best balance between upholding the fundamental rights of
criminal defendants and the legitimate societal interest in the admissibility of
reliable evidence of guilt.395 If courts applying Henderson and Lawson are able to use
those decisions effectively to protect defendants against tainted evidence, the use of
a totality-of-the-circumstances standard will have been vindicated. If, on the other
hand, courts prove unable to apply those decisions to provide adequate safeguards,
it will be time for the community of scientists, lawyers, and legal scholars to call in
unison for eyewitness rules that severely limit the discretion of judicial decision
makers. The most effective approach might involve rehabilitation of a Stovall-like
per se exclusionary rule, but with extensive and non-exclusive lists of the kinds of
conduct that deviate from best practices in conducting eyewitness identification
procedures and a requirement of exclusion of both pre-trial and in-court
identification evidence for any witness exposed to such procedures, as opposed to
the "independent source" tests used by New York and Massachusetts to admit most
in-court identifications even when pre-trial procedures were flawed. Given the
often disappointing track records even of states that have expressed some
commitment to using eyewitness science to guide the development of their law,
such stringent means of defining and limiting the discretion of trial judges might
prove necessary.
The aim of this article has not been to cast doubt on the possibility of
meaningfid reform of eyewitness identification law. The efforts of some states to
reduce wrongful conviction by eyewitness misidentification have certainly led to
some improvements in the collection and assessment of eyewitness evidence. Yet
even in states that have implemented laws and policies with real potential, what has
been done so far has been inadequate. Perhaps most discouraging, these states seem
to lack the courage of their stated scientific convictions. Most have been unwilling
to embrace the full consequences of the science they claim to endorse, and some
have actually retreated from directives that held significant promise. Rather than
patting themselves on the back, legislators and judges in these states should be
striving to do more. The history of the handful of states that have made serious
attempts at reform should also inform those interested in the development of the
law in New Jersey and states that have followed its lead. While scholars have
rightfully characterized Henderson as a landmark decision, the checkered results of
legal reform in other states should serve as a reminder of the necessity of
continuing refinements and constant vigilance against retreat from the scientific
principles to which the Henderson court expressed allegiance. To some extent, legal
... See Kahn-Fogel, Beyond Manson, supra note 28, at 303-10; see a/so Kahn-Fogel, Manson andIts
Progeny, supra note 4, at 225.
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innovation will always lag behind scientific developments. That disharmony is
exacerbated, however, when lawmakers, lawyers, and judges abdicate their
responsibility to seek truth and, instead, elevate folk wisdom, intuition, and
common sense over verifiable data.
